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ABSTRACT 
Whistle-blowing mechanisms have long been recognized and used as 
tools to encourage the revelation of hidden information. The information 
sought is often evidence of otherwise undetectable fraud. An effective 
mechanism will be one that best deters such fraud. To do this, the 
mechanism needs to produce high-quality information that is not 
otherwise lost in the noise of low-quality information. In this paper, we 
present a model to explore how the use of a court-centric qui tam 
mechanism as opposed to an agency-driven mechanism can improve 
whistle-blowing along these dimensions. 
We compare two leading mechanisms that have been implemented in 
high-profile federal statutes. The first is the court-centric qui tam 
mechanism embodied in the False Claims Act. The second is the agency-
centric system enacted as part of the Dodd Frank Act.  
The model demonstrates that the qui tam mechanism—which allows 
whistleblowers to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government—produces 
a separating equilibrium by imposing a private, loss contingent cost 
commitment on whistleblowers. When whistleblowers possess private 
information, the cost commitment screens out low-quality information 
while maintaining the incentives for high-quality information and lawsuits. 
In turn, enforcement and deterrence are improved. Counterintuitively, 
then, increasing costs and lowering rewards for whistleblowers can often 
lead to better enforcement and less fraud. 
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We conclude by exploring applications of this model and the resulting 
insights for other areas of private information and third-party enforcement 
mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 22, 2013, the Department of Justice joined a False Claims 
Act lawsuit against Lance Armstrong and his associates.
1
 The case had 
 
 
 1. See United States’ Notice of Election to Intervene in Part, United States ex rel. Floyd Landis 
v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976, 2013 WL 769485 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2013); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Joins Lawsuit Alleging Lance Armstrong and Others Caused the 
Submission of False Claims to the U.S. Postal Service (Feb. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-civ-224.html.  
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originally been filed by Floyd Landis years earlier.
2
 The substantive 
allegations are straightforward. Armstrong and the other defendants had 
taken sponsorship money from the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) 
while falsely representing that they were not using performance enhancing 
drugs or other doping techniques.
3
 The facts are equally straightforward. 
Armstrong famously confessed his sins of doping to Oprah.
4
 The contracts 
between the defendants and the USPS contain representations that no 
doping was occurring.
5
 All that remains is to determine whether that 
constitutes a false claim and whether and to what extent the USPS was 
damaged. 
Procedurally, matters are not so straightforward. Landis, who has no 
individual claims in this particular lawsuit, filed the suit as a qui tam 
action on behalf of the United States. Under the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”), a qui tam action allows individuals (known as “relators”) to file 
and pursue suits for wrongs committed against the government.
6
 Prior to 
February 22, it was Landis and his lawyers expending the resources and 
making the decisions in running the case. Pursuant to the statute, and the 
extensions granted by the judge, the suit remained sealed until the 
Department of Justice had completed its investigation and made a 
determination to join the suit.
7
 Now the Department of Justice is at the 
helm.
8
 But Landis still stands to receive a substantial percentage of any 
 
 
 2. Complaint for Violations of the Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Floyd Landis 
v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976 (D.D.C. June 10, 2010). 
 3. Second Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Claims Act, at 11–16, ¶¶ 36–43, 
United States ex rel. Floyd Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976, 2013 WL 647311 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2013).  
 4. Oprah and Lance Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive, (OWN television broadcast Jan. 17 
& 18, 2013), available at http://www.oprah.com/own/Lance-Armstrong-Confesses-to-Oprah-Video 
(video clip of part of broadcast) (last visited May 30, 2014). Prior to the Oprah Winfrey interview, 
Armstrong had persistently and vehemently denied all allegations of doping. His admission resolves 
some (though not all) of the foundational factual questions of the lawsuit. 
 5. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3. 
 6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006) [hereinafter “FCA”]. The substance of the claim here is 
somewhat uncommon for an FCA case. Most claims deal with recipients of government goods or more 
traditional government contractors. Here the USPS was acting like a private sponsor. Nonetheless, its 
location in the Federal government makes the FCA applicable. Other private sponsors are not covered. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Landis still retains some limited input in prosecuting cases. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (providing 
that a relator remains a party but setting out limitations on their participation). Complicated questions 
about jurisdiction, Landis’s qualifications as an original source relator, and other procedural hurdles 
imposed by the statute may remain. For example, Landis may not be able to recover anything if the 
information contained in his suit was already public and he was not the “original source” of the 
information. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). The defendants filed 
motions to dismiss in July 2013. The motions have yet to be decided and turn largely on statute of 
limitations grounds and the interplay between the FCA and the Wartime Suspension of Limitations 
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2012). 
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USPS recovery.
9
 And if history is any indicator, recovery is quite likely 
now that the Department of Justice has taken over.
10
 
Meanwhile, in the same district court, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has obtained an agreement from JPMorgan Chase to pay over 
$296 million in fines for misleading investors about the quality of 
mortgage-backed securities just before the 2008 financial crisis.
11
 How are 
these cases connected? Whistleblowers. The lawsuit leading to the 
JPMorgan settlement was brought by the SEC. But its allegations may 
have been derived from information provided to it by one or more 
unnamed whistleblowers.
12
 On February 8, 2013, the SEC invited any 
individuals claiming to have provided information that led to the 
settlement to make a claim for their whistleblower reward under the new 
whistleblower provision in the Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”).13 
The financial rewards for whistleblowers under the FCA and the DFA 
are similar.
14
 The procedural mechanisms for the JPMorgan 
whistleblowers to report and recover under the DFA, however, are 
different along many important dimensions from those for FCA claimants 
like Floyd Landis. The FCA whistleblower brings the case directly to the 
court on behalf of the government and must convince a judge that he has 
cleared a number of statutory hurdles. DFA whistleblowers, on the other 
hand, inform directly to the SEC. The procedure is more streamlined but 
prosecution and recovery is at the discretion of the SEC.
15
 At least in the 
 
 
 9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing an award for relators ranging from ten and thirty percent 
of the overall recovery). 
 10. There is a dramatic difference in overall success rate between those cases where the 
government does and does not intervene. See David Kwok, Does Private Enforcement Attract 
Excessive Litigation? Evidence from the False Claims Act, PUB. CONT. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript 
at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832934 (“as of September 20, 
2009, only 239 of 3,920 non-intervened cases resulted in a settlement or judgment in favor of the 
United States, a 6% success rate. In comparison, of the 1,134 cases in which the DOJ intervened, 1,076 
resulted in a settlement or judgment in favor of the United States, a 95% success rate.”). See also 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) (finding a stark difference in 
dismissal rates).  
 11. Litigation Release No. 22533, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan 
Securities, LLC With Misleading Investors in RMBS Offerings (Nov. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22533.htm. 
 12. See Notices of Covered Actions: 2013 Archive, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec. 
gov/about/offices/owb/owb-awards/2013-nocas.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 13. Id. 
 14. The DFA ranges from ten to thirty percent and the FCA ranges from fifteen to thirty percent. 
Compare Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010) with 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d). 
 15. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (“Any determination 
made under this section, including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in 
the discretion of the Commission”). The determination of the amount of the reward within the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/6
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initial inquiry, the court has no say in the DFA award,
16
 and the DOJ has 
no say in the FCA award.
17
  
Why the difference? And which is better? We explore those questions 
in this Article. We present a model demonstrating the value of the FCA 
qui tam mechanism in situations where it is difficult to verify the merits of 
the whistleblower’s claim. The qui tam process screens information and in 
turn improves enforcement and deterrence. Screening models are, of 
course, broadly relevant and well developed elsewhere. But the concept 
has not been addressed in the FCA or the DFA whistleblower context. We 
suggest that this neglected feature of the qui tam mechanism is perhaps its 
defining and most valuable characteristic.  
The existing literature on whistle-blowing has focused primarily on 
(1) the incentive effects of whistleblower rewards and protection,
18
 and 
(2) the regulatory capture that may necessitate empowering individuals to 
bring qui tam cases on behalf of the government.
19
 The first strand has 
been well explored theoretically and a new empirical literature is emerging 
to test those theories.
20
 But these tell us little about the comparative 
advantage of an FCA court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism and a DFA 
agency-centric mechanism.
21
  
 
 
statutory bounds of ten and thirty percent is unreviewable and other determinations are reviewed by 
the courts of appeals under the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 
IV 1965–69). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing rules for awards in FCA cases). 
 18. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1151 (2010); Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213 
(2010). 
 19. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall 
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 135; J. 
Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. 
REV. 539 (2000); Bucy, supra note 10, at 51. A third strand might be identified in the work, theoretical 
and empirical, on the proper design within one or the other mechanism. For example, David Freeman 
Engstrom tests the effectiveness of professional relators and a “qui tam bar” within the FCA 
mechanism. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui 
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012). We do not here explore every design question 
within each system. Our inquiry is more foundational in comparing an FCA-like mechanism to a DFA-
like mechanism.  
 20. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18. For a collection of empirical work, see Engstrom, supra 
note 19, at 1269 n.83. 
 21. Ferziger and Currell compared the FCA to other bounty systems in place in 1999. Their 
analysis long predates the DFA and the recent amendments to the FCA. They focused primarily on the 
FCA’s advantage in committing the government to a reward. That is not true of the agency 
whistleblower schemes they examined. They also explore the optimal level of reward. Marsha J. 
Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal 
Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The second strand provides a regulatory-capture and agency-incentive 
justification for preferring the court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism.
22
 
This suggests that executive agencies cannot be trusted, because of capture 
or resource constraints. This reasoning is flawed and under theorized. It is 
difficult to reconcile with any general theory of agency power. It provides 
no coherent explanation for why a court-centric private plaintiff 
mechanism should be utilized in whistleblower cases and not other agency 
investigations, prosecutions, and regulation. Rather it suggests an unusual 
and idiosyncratic solution for general agency-incentive problems and 
suggests no reason to think that a court-centric solution will be more 
effective than the alternatives.
23
  
We suggest a different justification for the FCA mechanism based on 
information screening. Starting with a rational actor model and assuming 
risk neutrality, we compare the two mechanisms.
24
 We show that the 
court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism
25
 is superior to the agency-
centric mechanism
26
 when there is asymmetric information
27
 because it 
screens for the most accurate information from whistleblowers. This 
private cost commitment is not required of the SEC whistleblower under 
the DFA scheme.  
Thus, the qui tam design should—all else being equal—create a 
separating equilibrium that enhances the overall quality of information to 
the enforcers and reduces the costs of effective enforcement. In turn, the 
design will increase the deterrence effect of whistle-blowing. These 
screening benefits are particularly important for a whistleblower scheme 
(with its inherent information asymmetry),
28
 and the outcome does not 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 19, at 135. 
 23. Regulatory capture has been studied generally. This literature identifies the problem in 
various contexts beyond whistle-blowing and explores various proposals for structural solutions. See 
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of 
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089 (1991); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: 
Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1991); Michael E. Levine & 
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a 
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & Org., Special Issue, Jan. 1990, at 167; Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. 
Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); see also 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel 
Carpenter & David A. Moss, Eds., 2013). 
 24. See infra notes 143–44 for a discussion of the impact of risk aversion, irrationality, and the 
role of non-pecuniary benefits for whistleblowers. 
 25. We will generally refer to this as the qui tam mechanism or the FCA-like mechanism. 
 26. We will refer to this as the DFA-like mechanism. 
 27. See infra Part II.A on the causes and dynamics of asymmetric information. 
 28. Information asymmetry exists when one party has information that is not available to the 
other. Whistleblower mechanisms by definition presuppose this state of affairs. If information were 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/6
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turn on the quality of the enforcing agency or the level of agency-incentive 
problems. We do not, however, suggest that all else is equal or that the 
FCA is perfectly designed. Our point is simply that its value in screening 
information through cost imposition has been under appreciated. To the 
extent other mechanisms can be modified to achieve this screening, they 
may be preferable to the FCA design. 
Indeed, this analysis provides new, prescriptive guidelines generally for 
designing whistleblower systems that effectively deter fraud in various 
contexts.
29
 Our analysis suggests that the worries of agency capture and a 
reduced quantity of information under the DFA are overemphasized. The 
more vexing concern will be an over-provision of tips relative to a 
mechanism that imposes some cost on the whistleblowers. This over-
provision will swamp the reviewing agency with low-quality information. 
If the agency is budget constrained and cannot easily distinguish low-
quality tips from high-quality tips, this shifts resources toward less 
effective investigation. Alternatively, it may shift enforcement to other 
types of cases with less information asymmetry even if those cases are 
otherwise less important.
30
 By reducing effective enforcement, this will in 
turn result in less deterrence. 
Even in the FCA model, an increase in the bounty payment can often 
lead to under-deterrence. That is, as the reward to the FCA relator is 
increased, the benefit of the screening of the qui tam mechanism dissipates 
and the outcome converges with the inefficient DFA result.
31
 Indeed, the 
 
 
available to the Government, the whistleblower would not be necessary. For more on asymmetric 
information, see infra Part II.A. 
 29. This analysis of the deterrence effect has been somewhat neglected in the literature 
evaluating the DFA and FCA whistleblower mechanisms. David Kwok looks at the different 
deterrence effects of FCA litigation in prosecuting different types of cases. He does not, however, 
address the deterrent effect of the qui tam mechanism compared to other mechanisms. Additionally, in 
addressing the way to increase deterrence, he concludes that the government should increase the 
bounty payments. See David Y. Kwok, The Price of Private Enforcement Under the False Claims Act 
13, 30 (Working Paper, Aug. 2012), available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_kwok/5. Heidi 
Hansberry also suggests that increased reporting leads to increased enforcement and, therefore, 
increased deterrence. See Heidi L. Hansberry, Comment, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, The Dodd-
Frank Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2012). We suggest 
that this is the wrong approach.  
 30. This may explain the surge in SEC enforcement of options-backdating investigations 
following the news reports demonstrating the prevalence of and statistical roadmap to identifying such 
violations even where the magnitude may have been quite small. On the rate of options-backdating 
cases, see Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard, & Anat Carmy Wiechman, Scandal Enforcement at the 
SEC: The Arc of the Options Backdating Investigations (U. of Mich. Law & Econ, Empirical Legal 
Studies Ctr. Paper No. 11-009; N.Y.U. Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-20, Jan. 14, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876725.  
 31. This is in direct contrast to Kwok, supra note 29, at 13, 30.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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screening model shows that the precise relationship between the level of 
compensation and the private costs that whistle-blowing imposes is more 
important than previously recognized.
32
 Our analysis also provides insight 
into the failure of private-plaintiff mechanisms in other environments 
where whistleblowers are not involved.
33
 
We proceed in three parts. In Part I, we explore the contrasts between 
the FCA and the DFA (and other mechanisms similar to the DFA). In Part 
II, we illustrate the information screening value of the qui tam mechanism, 
setting out a model for eliciting private information in the enforcement 
context. Part III explores larger implications and limitations of this model, 
namely (1) the likelihood that whistleblowers may not be motivated by 
financial rewards, but rather by morality or revenge; (2) the costs and 
errors that may arise when such mechanisms have been employed where 
information screening was not a central concern; and (3) other areas of law 
where we may or may not think court-centric private-plaintiff mechanisms 
can be valuably employed for information screening. 
I. JUSTIFYING THE COMPETING MECHANISMS 
A. The Different Mechanisms 
The mechanisms in the FCA and DFA are just two of many such 
mechanisms—statutory and judge made—that provide for private 
enforcement of public regulation. But they are among the most important. 
Together false claims and securities fraud litigation account for thousands 
of cases that have led to billions of dollars in recovery for the federal 
government.
34
 The FCA has been called the “gold standard” of 
whistleblower legislation and provides a powerful example of the qui tam 
 
 
 32. Ferziger’s and Currell’s 1999 article stands out as one of the rare pieces in the literature to 
note that a higher reward can lead to noise and inefficient enforcement. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 
21, at 1172. For the most part, Ferziger and Currell treat costs as given and focus on optimal rewards. 
They advocate a very low bounty to account for this and provide a model for setting rewards. We take 
their analysis further, exploring the effects on deterrence and delving deeper into the cost side of the 
equation. In contrast to their conclusion, our model suggests that rewards could be set very high (and 
often should be) if loss-contingent costs can be increased. 
 33. Attempts at private enforcement of public regulation have been well documented across 
various areas from corporate governance and securities to intellectual property to employment and 
environment law. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms 
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012). Many view the use of this mechanism in areas 
of corporate governance as a major failure. We explore the implications of our model in these broader 
contexts in Part III. 
 34. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1246 n.2 (collecting statistics). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/6
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mechanism.
35
 Its history since enactment during the Civil War has been 
well documented.
36
 It has been amended many times and contains many 
complex and at times difficult to interpret procedural provisions.
37
 In 
short, those provisions bar whistleblowers from bringing a false claims 
suit based on public information unless the whistleblower is the original 
source of that information.
38
  
The whistleblower files its lawsuit under seal and must provide the 
underlying information to the government.
39
 The government has sixty 
days (although extensions are often requested and granted) to review the 
allegations before it must decide whether to intervene and take over the 
lawsuit.
40
 If the government intervenes it takes over primary control of the 
lawsuit. If the government decides not to intervene, the relator retains 
control.
41
  
If the lawsuit is successful, the wrongdoer pays up to treble damages 
and penalties and the whistleblower receives a bounty under the statute.
42
 
This reward ranges from twenty-five to thirty percent of recovered 
damages where the government does not intervene and fifteen to twenty-
five percent of recovered damages where the government does intervene.
43
 
The DFA’s section 922 is the latest high-profile whistleblower 
provision. Modeled largely after the IRS’s whistleblower program,44 it 
provides a bounty to whistleblowers that bring information to the SEC if 
that information leads to a monetary sanction in a judicial or 
administrative action.
45
 The bounty is only available if the action “results 
 
 
 35. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005). 
 36. See Matthew S. Brockmeier, Pulling the Plug on Health Care Fraud: The False Claims Act 
after Rockwell and Allison Engine, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 277, 281–85 (2009) (discussing 
history of the FCA); Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1270 (summarizing history and collecting sources). 
 37. See Engstrom, supra note 19. Over the years, the statute has led to numerous circuit splits in 
interpreting various phrases within it. See Brockmeier, supra note 36, at 288–89 (noting the volume of 
circuit splits and documenting that “[c]ourts have been asked to interpret virtually every word of every 
provision of the Act at some point”). 
 38. “False claims” include false claims for money from the government under a contract or some 
other legal right as well as false statements of money owed to the government (reverse false claims).  
 39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).  
 40. Id. 
 41. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 
 42. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 132. Historically, the IRS had discretionary authority to pay 
whistleblowers. In 2006, awards became mandatory for large cases. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18, 
at 1168. 
 45. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010). 
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in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”46 The bounty given is 
bounded by statute to be between ten and thirty percent of the monetary 
sanctions imposed; but the exact amount within those bounds is subject to 
the discretion of the SEC.
47
 The initial mechanism for the reward does not 
involve the courts. The determination to issue or not issue the award may 
be appealed directly to the court of appeals. For those challenges, the SEC 
is given a high level of deference under 5 U.S.C. § 706.
48
 The 
determination of the amount of the award cannot be challenged in the 
courts.
49
  
B. Existing Justifications  
We demonstrate below that a central value of a qui tam mechanism 
over other forms of whistleblower procedures is the information-screening 
mechanism. An upshot of this is that qui tam is a particularly important 
mechanism where there is asymmetric information that is difficult to 
verify. Of the various justifications and benefits of the qui tam system over 
other mechanisms, the screening mechanism we model is the most 
distinctive—and potentially most valuable—feature of the mechanism. 
Indeed, most of the existing justifications in the whistleblower literature 
fail to explain why a qui tam process provides a better mechanism or why 
that mechanism is uniquely valuable in the whistleblower context. We 
explore these limitations of the existing literature in this section.  
The goals of a whistleblower mechanism are plain: we want to elicit 
the most accurate information at the lowest cost in order to deter fraud. 
The means are more complicated. The foundational inquiry, which has 
been explored in great detail, is whether it makes sense to pay individuals 
for information.
50
 The benefits of payment lie in the creation of pecuniary 
incentives to nudge otherwise reluctant informants to reveal what they 
know. The problems might include encouraging false information, and 
crowding out information that would otherwise be provided for non-
pecuniary reasons that include moral or ethical considerations.
51
 
 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. As of the end of the 2013 fiscal year, the SEC has made only six whistleblower awards as 
the bulk of qualifying cases are still pending. Five of the awards were in the thousands of dollars. The 
sixth was an award of $14 million. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 14–15, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf . 
 50. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18; Rapp, supra note 19; Engstrom, supra note 19. 
 51. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18 (on the interplay of moral and pecuniary incentives). 
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Nonetheless, recent empirical work shows that monetary incentives for 
fraud revelation do have a strong, positive effect on an employee’s 
decision to blow the whistle.
52
 This result holds irrespective of the severity 
of the fraud.
53
 The level of false information has been harder to test.
54
  
A second question that arises is who should receive the information 
from the whistleblower and what should be done with it. A fear of 
regulatory capture and political influence has led many to believe that the 
individuals within executive branch agencies and departments cannot be 
trusted with acting on information that their long-time business partners 
are defrauding the government. The regulatory-capture story is that the 
industry has “captured” the agency and exercises influence on its 
decisions. The political influence story is similar.
55
 The influence comes 
from politically elected officials above the agency. In turn, those officials 
may be captured by special-interest groups. The solutions to these 
problems may be at odds with each other: political oversight might curb 
regulatory capture at the agency level but increase potentially problematic 
political influence. In that sense, the political oversight just moves the 
capture problem up one step in the command chain. 
 
 
The argument that providing financial rewards may crowd out better information comes from 
behavioral psychology literature. We do not address this argument in detail. The idea is that providing 
information is good when provided with altruistic motives. Increasing the rewards dilutes the quality 
of the information because informers feel the monetary reward cheapens their role. See Diego G. 
Pardow, What Should We Expect From the Dodd-Frank Bounty Program? (Working Paper, July 23, 
2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/dpardow/1. This argument assumes that altruistic 
ventures, such as donating blood, may lose their altruistic qualities once financial compensation is 
given. This may lead to a “crowding out” of blood, especially high-quality blood. See RICHARD M. 
TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971); Philippa 
Howden-Chapman, John Carter, & Nicholas Woods, Blood Money: Blood Donors’ Attitudes to 
Changes in the New Zealand Blood Transfusion Service, 312 BRITISH MED. J. 1131 (1996). The 
evidence for this idea, however, in the blood donation context is somewhat mixed. See, e.g., Carl 
Mellström & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 845 (2008) (finding no crowding out effect in males, but a significant effect in females); 
Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, & Robert Slonim, Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17636, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w17636. 
 52. Dyck et al., supra note 18, at 2215. The authors find that this effect is particularly strong in 
the healthcare industry. Engstrom suggests that Dyck et al.’s result may follow from the fact that 
potential whistleblowers in the healthcare industry are better positioned to observe fraud because of 
the industry’s relatively flat organizational structure and the result tells us little about the degree of 
crowding out compared to a world where bounties are not available to healthcare workers. David 
Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge 
of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341808. 
 53. Dyck et al., supra note 18, at 2215. 
 54. There may also be concerns that rewards might lead potential whistleblowers to facilitate or 
encourage fraud in hopes of reporting it later. There is no evidence that this is a significant problem. 
 55. See sources cited supra note 23. 
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These fears have long been cited as a defense of the FCA’s grant of 
prosecutorial authority to individuals on behalf of the government. When 
the executive branch fails to do so, the individual may pursue the case in 
court subject to dismissal by the court.
56
 Similarly, regulatory capture has 
been at the heart of critiques of alternative mechanisms like the DFA. 
Because those mechanisms leave the discretion to the government agency, 
it is argued, they lead to too few investigations and prosecutions.
57
  
This argument places a great deal of faith in the judiciary as immune to 
agency capture. The assumption is that the judiciary is not subject to 
outside influence and enforcement constraints the way that agencies are. 
While this may be correct, the conclusion requires more theoretical and 
empirical grounding than has been provided.
58
 Of course, this faith (often 
under-theorized) in courts as outside guardians of proper incentives is not 
at all unique to this case. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have noted 
that this problem—which they label the inside-outside problem—is an 
incoherency that pervades much of legal scholarship.
59
 As Posner and 
Vermeule point out, it may very well be true that courts have more public-
spirited and less selfish motives than other government actors, or that the 
institutional structure constrains their self-driven motives more, but that 
point should not be assumed without further foundational support.
60
 
On the other side of the equation, the arguments in favor of a judicial 
process assume that no executive agency can be designed to significantly 
reduce regulatory capture. This assumption has stronger empirical and 
theoretical support. While the SEC’s organization as an independent 
agency
61
 may be viewed as an attempt to reduce political influence from 
the executive,
62
 many suspect there is a regulatory-capture problem that 
 
 
 56. The real shift might be not to the relators but to the courts that exercise ultimate authority. 
 57. Rapp, supra note 19. 
 58. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 422, Mar. 2013), available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_ 
and_ legal_theory/395/. 
 59. Id. at 22, 37. 
 60. Id. at 7–8. It is also possible that if courts defer to government agencies, they could indirectly 
be captured by the industry. Government agencies or departments are captured by the industry; the 
court defers to the government; the court has thus been captured.  
 61. On independent agencies, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing the key features of independent 
agencies); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
 62. Some may argue that its independence exacerbates the regulatory capture problem, because 
the executive has less direct control and the industry is especially influential. Of course, that might be 
viewed as trading capture from one constituency for capture from another. Barkow, supra note 61, at 
34–35 (summarizing various arguments). 
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arises from the coziness that exists between the SEC and the finance 
industry.
63
 But all of this begs the question of why we worry more or 
differently about capture in whistleblower cases. Agencies routinely 
investigate, enforce and regulate industries where the risk of capture is 
high. Much ink has been spilled in suggesting mechanisms and structures 
that employ internal and external checks on a given agent’s bad incentives. 
Dual agencies, independent monitors, court oversight, congressional 
oversight, and overlapping state power are just a few of the proposed 
solutions.
64
 Even oversight by a central agency like DOJ or OIRA can be 
seen as a potential curb to some of the agency-capture problems.
65
 It is not 
clear why the use of private plaintiffs and the shift of gatekeeping to the 
courts are better than other solutions; or, if they are, why they should only 
be utilized in the whistleblower cases. 
Indeed, one might worry more about the non-whistleblower cases. The 
SEC’s capture by the industry should concern us with SEC criminal 
enforcement, SEC rule setting, SEC trading review, and so on. The 
assumption that we only worry about the capture when an outsider blows a 
whistle on an offense unknown to the SEC has a weak logical foundation. 
This point can be seen in other areas of regulation that intersect with 
the FCA. For example, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
(formerly an agency of the Department of the Interior) regulated federal 
natural resources and collected royalties on oil and gas taken from Federal 
lands.
66
 The MMS was disgraced in 2008 when it came to light that its 
employees received lavish gifts from industry representatives and had 
“frequently consumed alcohol at industry functions, had used cocaine and 
 
 
 63. See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop?, The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 785–86 
(2009) (“The SEC has been the target of relentless criticism . . . [including] assertions of delays and 
blunders and possible industry capture . . . .”); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory 
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995).  
 64. See sources cited supra notes 19 & 20. 
 65. See, e.g., Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional 
Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990); but see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1308, 1312 (2006). The nuances of these arguments are 
further discussed in Barkow, supra note 61; Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and 
Regulatory Review (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-69; N.Y.U. 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-47, Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201042; and Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential 
Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013). 
 66. The MMS no longer exists. It has been replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. See The Reorganization of 
the Former MMS, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/ 
Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
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marijuana, and had sexual relationships with oil and natural gas company 
representatives.”67  
One might be relieved to know that when whistleblowers allege that 
the MMS was duped out of royalties on federal oil or gas, the Department 
of Justice cannot prevent the case from going forward. But it is not clear 
why. The DOJ is not the captured agency in these cases.
68
 A simpler 
solution, if direct agency capture was the main problem, might have been 
just to move the prosecution on tips up to the DOJ level without granting 
qui tam protection. Some have even suggested that the qui tam process 
introduces its own major capture problem.
69
 The DOJ has less of the 
coziness with the oil executives it sues than the MMS does. But once you 
introduce the qui tam mechanism, you introduce a different coziness that 
comes from many qui tam relators’ counsel being former DOJ lawyers and 
future employers of current DOJ lawyers. This is the classic revolving 
door problem.
70
  
Moreover, it is the abuses that the MMS did know about that should 
worry us most. If a federal agency is sitting on information that is in its 
possession and either doing nothing or doing too little, that is a good 
signal of some agency problem. And if coziness is the problem, we might 
think that the mishandling of existing investigations would be common. 
But the FCA essentially excludes these cases from plaintiff’s power and 
judicial oversight. As a practical matter, the whistleblower has to acquire 
the relevant information from outside of the agency. A media report that 
the agency is sitting on information would be a public disclosure that bars 
suit by anyone without independent information. Similarly, a 
whistleblower who identified the case through a FOIA request would be 
barred from independently proceeding as a whistleblower.
71
 This leaves no 
room for outside whistleblowers to police agency enforcement. For 
example, in the MMS context, the Department of Interior’s investigative 
report uncovered a scheme where lucrative contracts were being awarded 
improperly with major conflicts of interest. In several cases the 
 
 
 67. Oil Brokers Sex Scandal May Affect Drilling Debate, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2008, 10:18 
AM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-09-11-oil-scandal-drilling 
_N.htm (quoting from investigative report by Interior Department).  
 68. Of course, the DOJ could itself be captured and putting pressure on the MMS. But the facts 
of the cases suggest the problem was precisely the opposite. See id. 
 69. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1251–52. 
 70. Engstrom attempts to test these claims with new empirical data. See id. 
 71. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011). 
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Department of Justice declined to prosecute the offenders.
72
 There was 
nothing that qui tam relators could do about that. These conflicts would be 
hard to fit under a false claims act violation. But, more fundamentally, no 
whistleblower could qualify as an original source of information that had 
already been disclosed in a government report.
73
 
Concerns of political influence where capture is occurring higher up 
the chain are rampant in the Lance Armstrong case. Allegations of 
attempts to capture government officials have circled the case for years. 
Some allege that a federal criminal investigation was dropped against him 
under odd circumstances.
74
 Moreover, one Congressman appeared to be 
using his influence to stop the United States Anti Doping Agency 
(USADA) from investigating Lance Armstrong.
75
 In response to the 
allegations and proceedings USADA brought against Armstrong and his 
affiliates, the Congressman asked for the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) to investigate the use of taxpayer funds given to 
USADA. The letter requesting the investigation included a lengthy 
defense of Armstrong including the oft-repeated (but false) recitation that 
Armstrong had never failed a drug test even though he had been tested 
over 500 times.
76
 Disappointed with the response from ONDCP and the 
continued investigation, the Congressman somewhat ominously 
announced: “I will continue to follow USADA’s activities with interest.”77 
 
 
 72. Emma Schwartz, No More Sex, Drugs, and Gifts, ABC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://abc 
news.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5836045.  
 73. It might be argued that the political system provides the appropriate check on the DOI’s or 
DOJ’s failure to pursue claims in these cases. But the same political mechanism would work if the 
FCA placed the DOI or DOJ rather than the relator in charge of prosecuting whistleblower claims.  
 74. Reed Albergotti, Armstrong Lobbying Targeted Investigator, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2013, 
5:48 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732444910457831194185128 
4534.html (lobbying firm was hired on Armstrong’s behalf to raise questions about the FDA 
investigation); Pete Yost, Influence Game: Armstrong Lobbying Cycle, AP’S THE BIG STORY (July 17, 
2012, 4:35 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/influence-game-armstrongs-lobbying-cycle (noting the 
influence Armstrong had on Congress); Report: Armstrong’s Influence Extends Beyond Sport, 
CYCLINGNEWS.COM (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/report-armstrongs-influence-
extends-beyond-sport (same). 
 75. Christian Red, USADA's Lance Armstrong Probe Met with Opposition by Politicians 
Including Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 8:47 PM), available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/armstrong-probe-thwarted-politics-article-1.1186090.  
 76. Letter from Congressman Sensenbrenner to ONDCP (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=303025. As has now been 
established, the statement that Armstrong never failed a test was false. See Oprah and Lance 
Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive, (OWN television broadcast Jan. 17 & 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.oprah.com/own_tv/onc/lance-armstrong-one.html. 
 77. Statement of Congressman Sensenbrenner (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://sensenbrenner. 
house.gov/news/documentprint.aspx?DocumentID=303025 (statement in response to the Office of 
Nat’l Drug Control Policy’s reply to the Congressman’s inquiry into the roughly $9 million in taxpayer 
funds given to the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency). 
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Again, none of these agency problems can be addressed by qui tam 
litigation. The conflicts relate to investigations that are beyond the reach of 
the FCA. Floyd Landis has no ability to prosecute a federal criminal 
investigation against Armstrong. Only the civil allegations about the USPS 
contract, of which Landis has independent knowledge, could have gone 
forward without government approval. But if the qui tam mechanism is 
about curbing agency problems, we should grant individuals the right to 
bring suits whenever there is a potential conflict, not just where 
information resides outside of the regulators’ possession. We do not see 
that. Instead, the mechanism is only employed where the supposedly 
captured agent is presented with information that he or she has likely 
never seen before. 
We might even think we trust the captured agent more when the 
information is new and comes only from a whistleblower. The surprise at 
the information, and the possibility that the whistleblower will go public 
against the captured agent as well should serve as an incentive to prosecute 
that is not present in other cases. 
The arguments for not allowing private citizens to prosecute all 
government claims (criminal or civil) in the face of a conflict of interest 
include avoiding interference with government functioning and a 
deference to the political process. Again, those apply equally in the 
whistleblower context. The DFA prevents individuals from interfering 
with the SEC’s enforcement process and there may be political 
ramifications if the SEC ignores whistleblowers. The same should be true 
for the MMS. In some sense, the SEC is less politically accountable than 
the MMS and the DOI and more susceptible to pressure from the 
industry,
78
 suggesting that the DFA and FCA mechanisms are inaptly 
designed. Under an agency-capture theory, qui tam mechanisms should be 
more desirable when the agency is independent and not politically 
accountable.
79
  
All of this is to say that the existing justifications for preferring an FCA 
mechanism to a DFA mechanism are unsatisfactory.
80
 It is not clear that 
 
 
 78. See sources cited supra note 65. 
 79. This is true if we think that the capture is coming from the industry representatives who deal 
with the agency. The opposite would be true if we think inappropriate influence is coming from the 
White House or the DOJ. 
 80. There are other justifications based more on psychological benefits for whistleblowers that 
we do not address. Geoffrey Rapp, for example, criticizes the DFA regime for not providing bounties 
when the damages against the fraudulent party are less than $1 million. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 
92–95, 143–44. Rapp also notes that a qui tam action would have provided plaintiffs with a forum to 
be heard. Id. at 78. The argument is based on the behavioral psychology approach that suggests 
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2014] NOISE REDUCTION: THE SCREENING VALUE OF QUI TAM 1185 
 
 
 
 
there is anything unique about a whistleblower case that raises additional 
concerns about agency capture than other roles played by agencies. And 
we do not see many proposals to hand the entire administrative state over 
to the courts.
81
 It has also been noted that agency-capture problems are 
likely to be present within the qui tam mechanism as well.
82
 Resource-
constraint arguments fall to a similar challenge. If qui tam cases encourage 
claims that an agency cannot prosecute because of resource constraints, it 
is difficult to justify using that mechanism only when the agency does not 
possess the relevant information. This is equally unlikely.
83
 
We should not take this critique as a reason to embrace the DFA over 
the FCA. There is, as we show in Part II, a stronger justification for the 
FCA mechanism design. It has nothing to do with agency capture. Rather, 
it is all about information screening. And we suggest, even with all of the 
faith in the SEC as being trustworthy beyond reproach, the FCA provides 
a better mechanism than the DFA for dealing with whistleblower cases. 
We are not the first to critique the new DFA whistle-blowing regime for 
omitting qui tam provisions. Other commentators, however, have focused 
on aspects other than the screening benefits that qui tam would have 
provided.
84
 We demonstrate the advantage of the FCA’s procedures in 
screening information in the next part. 
II. SCREENING THE QUALITY OF A WHISTLEBLOWER’S INFORMATION 
Many benefits and costs of whistle-blowing are common to both the 
DFA and the FCA. The key distinction between the two is that under the 
FCA, an informant brings the information to the attention of the 
government through a private qui tam action; under the DFA, an informant 
anonymously brings information to the regulatory agency.  
In this section, we develop a model to illustrate that qui tam actions in 
the FCA provide a useful mechanism for screening the quality of a 
 
 
whistleblowers are motivated by more than just money. This is no doubt true. Rapp uses experimental 
evidence to suggest that qui tam gives whistleblowers “a chance to tell their stories and to restore their 
reputations.” See id.  
 81. Nor is it obvious that there is anything unique about judicial oversight that makes it the only 
solution to regulatory-capture problems. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 58. 
 82. See Engstrom, supra note 19 (examining DOJ regulatory capture within the FCA regime). 
 83. Many proposals for private bidding on the right to pursue actions for others provide a 
mechanism for providing financing for profitable lawsuits that may not be pursued because of resource 
constraints that limit litigation. Nothing in the system requires that a resource constrained entity also 
be information constrained. See infra text accompanying notes 158–66 for a discussion of these 
dynamics in the context of shareholder derivative suits. 
 84. See supra notes 18–20. 
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whistleblower’s information. We show that increasing the rewards for 
informing or decreasing the private cost of informing—such as the regime 
provided for under the DFA—dilutes the quality of the information 
brought forward. We also show the counter-intuitive result that increasing 
the rewards to whistleblowers may lead to an increase in the underlying 
fraud. Our model builds on rich law and economics literature exploring the 
differences between litigation and regulation. This literature, however, has 
largely focused on the effectiveness of ex post litigation compared to ex 
ante regulation.
85
 The ex ante regulation of corporate fraud in the United 
States before the DFA was commonly critiqued for its ineffectiveness.
86
 
Here, our model departs from this literature by exploring the deterrent 
effects of two different forms of ex post litigation.  
A. Screening as a Solution to the Problem of Hidden Information in 
Whistle-blowing 
The hidden information problem is illustrated by George Akerlof’s 
classic example of the market for second-hand cars.
87
 The seller of a 
second-hand car knows whether the product is high quality or whether it is 
low quality (i.e., a “lemon”). The buyer, on the other hand, is poorly 
informed. He cannot determine, without incurring high cost, whether the 
car is a lemon or not. This hidden information causes the market to 
unravel. That is, bad cars “drive out” the good cars, because the two types 
of cars sell for the same price. This “lemons problem” is pervasive in all 
aspects of a market economy where one side of the market is better 
informed than the other.
88
 
 
 
 85. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input 
and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEG. STUDIES 193 (1977); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus 
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEG. STUDIES 357 (1984); Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of 
Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 271 (1984); Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei 
Shleifer, An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation, 56 J. OF L. & ECON. 1 (2013); REGULATION VS. 
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); ANDREI 
SHLEIFER, THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS (2012). 
 86. See Rapp, supra note 19; Dyck et al., supra note 18. 
 87. In the early 1970s, economists generated models illustrating how asymmetric information 
can distort the efficiency of markets. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).  
 88. For example, how does a potential employer know whether a job candidate is productive or 
lazy? The job candidate has a far better idea about her own productivity than the firm does. The 
information asymmetry means that a highly productive worker is treated as an unproductive worker; 
she is offered a wage that is below her worth. From a theoretical perspective, see generally DOUGLAS 
G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 153–56 (1994).  
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There are two actions that can help alleviate the problem of asymmetric 
information: signaling and screening. Signaling takes place when the 
better-informed side of the market takes steps to indicate their type to the 
less-informed side of the market.
89
 That is, individuals with better 
information can signal their type.  
Screening is closely linked to signaling, but it differs in one key 
respect. In a signaling model, the better-informed player moves first to 
send a signal to the less well-informed player of their attributes. In a 
screening model, the less well-informed player moves first. For example, a 
hiring firm can screen the productivity of workers by offering higher 
wages for candidates with higher educational levels.
90
 In screening 
models, the party with poorer information sets up a screen in order to 
determine the type of the better-informed party. It is a mechanism by 
which the less well-informed party can extract private information from 
the better-informed party.  
The lemons problem arises in the context of whistle-blowing. The 
government cannot determine the quality of a whistleblower’s information 
without engaging in a costly investigation. But this does not mean that the 
government should simply rely on ex ante regulation. Rather, the 
government can screen the information that a whistleblower brings 
forward. 
Ex ante regulation of fraudulent behavior is often difficult and 
expensive. In the context of the FCA and government procurement, the 
federal government contracts for a wide variety of goods and services 
ranging from computers to aircraft carriers, from construction materials to 
medical services through Medicare reimbursements. The federal 
government spends over a trillion dollars each year on discretionary 
 
 
 89. In the second-hand car example, the dealer may distinguish between high- and low-quality 
cars by offering longer warranties for high-quality cars. The longer the warranty is signaling that the 
car is high quality.  
 90. In 1973, Michael Spence illustrated that an individual’s education level can operate as a 
signal for productivity. Imagine that there are two types of people: productive workers and 
unproductive workers. An unproductive worker has a higher cost of completing more years of 
education than the productive worker. Consequently, a productive worker can signal their type to 
potential employers by undertaking more years of education. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 
87 Q. J. OF ECON. 355 (1973). For these contributions to economics, George Akerlof and Michael 
Spence (along with Joseph Stiglitz, another prominent economist who studied problems of asymmetric 
information) were awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. See Press Release, Nobelprize.org, 
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 (Oct. 10, 2001), 
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/press.html. 
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spending.
91
 In the context of the DFA and SEC regulation, there are, on 
average, about 2.7 billion trades made per day on the New York Stock 
Exchange.
92
 Analyzing and regulating every single contract, transaction, or 
document for evidence of fraud is simply not practicable or cost 
effective.
93
 Some evidence on the ineffectiveness of ex ante regulation in 
detecting fraud might be reflected in the fact that the SEC detected only 
seven percent of alleged major corporate scandals between 1996 and 
2004.
94
  
To use resources more efficiently, government regulators often seek to 
rely on information provided by whistleblowers that have better 
information about the existence of fraud.
95
 As noted above, however, the 
government must contend with the problem of hidden information. The 
government does not know, ex ante, how strong the whistleblower’s 
information is. On one hand, the whistleblower could have high-quality 
information. She may have actually been involved in the fraud or she may 
be privy to sensitive information about how the fraud was conducted. On 
the other hand, the whistleblower may be poorly informed and have low-
quality information. The employee may not understand the nature of the 
behavior or what constitutes fraud. The whistleblower’s information may 
not establish the merits of the claim. Alternatively, the whistleblower may 
have a vendetta against the firm and over-blow the quality of information 
she knows is weak. Put simply, the government regulator finds it difficult 
to determine whether a whistleblower’s information is high-quality 
information or whether the information is a lemon. 
Consider the following example. A former employee of a healthcare 
provider approaches the government regulator and informs them that his 
former employer has been making excessive and inaccurate claims for 
Medicare reimbursements. The government regulator is unable to assess, 
 
 
 91. In fiscal year 2012, discretionary spending by the federal government was $1.285 trillion, 
slightly less than the $1.344 trillion requested in the budget. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET 
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013 TO 2023 (2013). 
 92. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., http://www.nyse.com/financials/-1022221393023.html#dlyvolume 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 93. On the inefficiency of ex ante regulatory enforcement costs, see Steven Shavell, A 
Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation (Harvard John M. 
Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 731, Sept. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2144553. 
 94. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010). 
 95. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), over forty percent of 
fraud detection occurs as a result of tips. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2010 REPORT 
TO THE NATIONS, available at http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/ 
rttn-2010.pdf (last visited May 31, 2014). 
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ex ante, whether the former employee genuinely has inside information 
that fraud has been committed, has an unfounded hunch, or is simply using 
a weak signal to seek revenge against his former employers.
96
 The 
government cannot know the quality of the information the whistleblower 
has without engaging in a costly investigation.  
Whistle-blowing laws are enacted with the express purpose of inducing 
parties with private information about socially costly dishonest or illegal 
behavior to come forward to the poorly informed government. The 
government seeks a mechanism that encourages whistleblowers with high-
quality information to come forward but at the same time, discourages 
whistleblowers with low-quality information from coming forward. 
Investigations of claims made by low-quality informants are a waste of 
society’s resources. 
In the next section, we illustrate how a qui tam mechanism screens out 
low-quality information with a simple game-theory model. 
B. The Model of Screening  
Here, we sketch our model that captures the essence of a screening 
mechanism of the FCA whistle-blowing scheme. We start with two 
foundational assumptions and then later discuss what happens when those 
assumptions are relaxed. First, we assume that the deterrence is a proper 
and dominant goal of these anti-fraud statutes. This is consistent with the 
public rhetoric and legislative history surrounding both statutes.
97
 Second, 
as is customary, we assume a rational actor framework. The impact of 
imposing costs and offering rewards will obviously differ if 
whistleblowers or those committing fraud are not rational. This is not to 
say, however, that our model cannot account for non-pecuniary costs and 
rewards. A whistleblower may get value from morality, indignation, or 
revenge. As with any other payoff that value must be considered when 
designing the correct cost-reward dynamic.   
 
 
 96. For literature on revenge as a motive see Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1275 n.109 (collecting 
sources). 
 97. That being said, the same conclusions hold if we assume a dominant punitive goal. Other 
theories of punishment may focus on factors such as the expressive power of law to make certain rules 
more salient, provide behavioral focal points, or to otherwise shift norms. See generally Richard H. 
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000). Our model does not 
address those facets of anti-fraud law. 
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1. The Decision to Commit Fraud (Firms) 
Let’s first examine the potential for a firm to engage in socially costly 
fraudulent behavior. Much of the academic literature on qui tam actions 
starts from the assumption that fraud has occurred.
98
 From an economic 
perspective, however, the whistleblower scheme only provides value if it 
deters socially costly fraudulent behavior. This deterrent effect is explicit 
in our model. 
Consider an example of fraudulent behavior that could be captured 
under the FCA. Firms make the decision whether or not to commit fraud 
when contracting with the government. The economy has 1000 
government contracts to supply various building materials. Each contract 
is worth $20 million. These 1000 contacts are awarded to 1000 different 
suppliers in the economy, who comprise a subset of a larger number of 
potential suppliers. Each firm has the option to fraudulently misrepresent 
the quality of the building materials used by the firm.  
Assume that there are two types of firms: efficient firms and inefficient 
firms. Efficient firms have a low cost of supplying high-quality materials. 
Assume that they receive no private benefit from fraudulently 
misrepresenting the quality of their materials. These efficient firms make 
up ninety percent of all firms. The inefficient firms, on the other hand, can 
privately benefit from fraudulent behavior if their fraudulent behavior 
remains undetected. By misrepresenting the quality of their product, they 
stand to gain $6 million. These inefficient firms make up about ten percent 
of all firms. This fraudulent behavior is costly to society as a whole. 
Assume each case of fraudulent behavior in each contract costs society 
$10 million. This social cost comes from the misallocation of resources, 
mismatching of contracting partners, and procurement of substandard 
materials.
99
  
While fraudulent contracting is socially costly, the government agency 
or regulatory body investigating fraud does not have the resources to 
investigate all 1000 government contracts. Assume the government agency 
is afforded a budget of $50 million to investigate fraud and each 
investigation costs the agency $1 million. If the agency chooses to spend 
the $1 million, they will know with certainty whether or not fraud has 
been committed. If fraud has been committed, the case against the 
dishonest firm is clear and the information is verifiable before a court of 
 
 
 98. See supra Part I. 
 99. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 330 (2004). 
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law. The agency can only investigate fifty claims, at most, under the 
budgetary restrictions. For simplicity, assume that if the government 
agency tries to spread the budget across more than fifty cases, and spends 
less than $1 million on any one investigation, the probability of accurately 
detecting fraud falls to zero. We further assume that if an inefficient firm 
is investigated and found guilty of making fraudulent claims against the 
government, the firm pays damages of $20 million (or, is simply forced to 
pay back the contract money).
100
 
In a first, best world—where the government agency investigating 
fraud has perfect information and can distinguish between an efficient firm 
and an inefficient firm—there would be no problem of fraud. The agency 
would simply restrict its investigations to the 100 inefficient firms, 
increasing the likelihood of being detected to fifty percent. (Recall that 
there are only fifty investigations). When the probability of detection is 
fifty percent, the expected damages are $10 million (fifty percent of the 
$20 million damages). This is far greater than the $6 million of private 
benefit that an inefficient firm can stand to gain from committing fraud.
101
 
As a consequence, inefficient firms will be truthful about the costs of their 
materials and will be less likely to win government contracts. Fraudulent 
behavior is deterred. 
The problem of fraud, however, exists when the government agency 
does not have perfect information. If the agency has weak ex ante 
information about which firms are committing fraud, it may perhaps 
randomly selecting fifty of the 1000 contracts to investigate. The 
likelihood of a fraudulent firm getting caught is now just five percent. The 
expected damages that a fraudulent, inefficient firm will have to pay, 
therefore, are only $1 million (five percent of $20 million). Given that the 
private benefit of committing fraud is $6 million, it is in their private 
interests to commit fraud.
102
  
In the equilibrium outcome here, all inefficient firms commit fraud. 
The inefficient firms know that the government agency may simply 
randomize; they know that the agency cannot ex ante detect which firms 
are potential fraudsters. The social cost of this fraudulent behavior is high. 
 
 
 100. Under the FCA, treble damages may be awarded. The fact that the government could claim 
up to $60 million here does not change the substance of the screening mechanism described below; it 
merely affects the height of the hurdles. 
 101. If the government has perfect information as to the efficiency of the firm at the front end of 
the contracting process, then there would be no problem of fraud in the first place. The inefficient 
firms would simply not win contracts over efficient firms.  
 102. It also follows that an efficient firm will never commit fraud under these assumptions. The 
efficient firm generates no private benefit from committing fraud.  
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Not only will inefficient firms commit fraud, but the government agency 
also wastes $40 million investigating claims against efficient firms. This 
misallocation of the regulator’s investigation resources may attract further 
costs as efficient firms waste resources to defend themselves against non-
meritorious investigations. This may discourage efficient firms from 
contracting with the government in the future.
103
  
In order to better distinguish between efficient and inefficient firms, the 
government agency seeks to rely on inside information from individual 
employees of these firms. But that information is only useful if it is 
accurate. For example, the government may get 100 accurate inside reports 
of fraud tips and 400 inaccurate inside reports based on weak information. 
If the government cannot distinguish the tips, it has to randomly choose 
fifty of the firms to investigate. In expectation those fifty investigations 
will lead to ten fraudulent firms (or twenty percent) being caught. The 
expected penalty for fraudulent firms will be $4 million (twenty percent of 
$20 million), and they will not be deterred.  
The next subsection looks at the incentives whistleblowers have to 
come forward with these tips.  
2. The Decision to Blow the Whistle (Informants) 
In our model, an employee at each of these firms may receive private 
information about whether his firm has committed fraud. The individual 
receives a signal that is either strong or weak. The strong signal of fraud 
may be seeing a smoking gun document that outlines how the firm has 
dishonestly contracted with the government. The weak signal of fraud may 
simply be rumor or hearsay about dishonest or fraudulent dealings.  
Employees at any type of firm—efficient or inefficient—can receive a 
weak signal of fraud. These weak signals are evenly distributed across all 
firms. We will assume the signal is correct only ten percent of the time. 
Only employees of inefficient and fraudulent firms, however, can receive a 
strong signal. That is, if an employee receives a strong signal that fraud is 
occurring, he has strong information that the firm is inefficient and has 
committed fraud. We assume that each employee knows the quality of his 
own information. He knows whether the information is strong or weak and 
he knows the likelihood that the information is correct. Put simply, he 
knows the probability the claim of fraud will be successfully proven. 
 
 
 103. These arguments against the FCA have been made before in the literature. See, e.g., William 
E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement 
Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (1998). The problem will be even greater under the DFA. 
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The government agency investigating fraud can harness the employee’s 
inside information about fraud to help overcome their information 
deficiencies. There are two problems, however, that the government must 
address if seeking to incentivize whistle-blowing behavior. First, the 
government agency cannot ex ante determine the quality of the 
information that is brought before them by the whistleblower. The 
employee makes a claim, but the government cannot determine whether 
the individual has received a strong signal of fraud or a weak signal of 
fraud. In order to verify the information, the government must launch a 
full-scale investigation at a cost of $1 million.
104
 
Second, there is a private cost that an individual employee must bear 
when blowing the whistle on fraudulent behavior. These costs include 
potential retaliation by the employer or restrictions on promotions or other 
employment opportunities in the future. Many whistleblowers either lose 
their job or are demoted. These private costs will be discussed in greater 
detail below.
105
 For now, let’s assume that the whistleblower estimates 
these costs to be $250,000. There are two ways for the government to 
improve the benefit-cost balance. One way is to minimize the cost of 
blowing the whistle by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. Another 
method is to increase the benefit side of the equation by compensating the 
whistleblower for any losses he may incur if he does provide the 
information.
106
 Consistent with the economic literature, we assume that the 
government can incentivize individuals with financial reward; if the 
whistleblower expects to receive at least $250,000 in compensation, he 
will be incentivized to come forward.
107
 In the next sub-section, we model 
the institutional framework of different types of whistle-blowing schemes 
to illustrate the benefits of qui tam actions.  
 
 
 104. We assume that this investigation cost of the government is constant and there is no 
difference between the cost of investigating a tip that comes directly to the agency and the cost of 
investigating the veracity of a claim made by an individual in a suit.  
 105. See infra Part II.B.3.b. 
 106. The economics literature on rewards—and rewards from private enforcement—is vast. The 
underlying incentive of the agent responding to a reward is at the heart of the rational actor model in 
law and economics. In the context of private enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION 
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 21–31 (2010) 
(discussing the incentive structure of litigation). 
 107. As noted below, there may be different types of information about fraud where individuals 
are willing to provide tips for free. See infra Part III. 
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3. The Structure of Whistle-Blowing Laws (Government) 
In our model, the government agency investigating fraud recognizes 
that whistleblowers must be financially incentivized to blow the whistle. 
In this sub-section, we explore different institutional options open to the 
government. 
a. Financial Reward Schemes 
Let’s first spell out why a “flat fee” or fixed payment made to every 
employee who blows the whistle will not work. If the government agency 
offers $250,000 to any employee who has received a signal of fraud, all 
potential whistleblowers that receive a signal—weak or strong—will come 
forward.
108
 This incentive scheme will generate too much whistle-blowing: 
The government will not be able to ex ante distinguish between well-
informed whistleblowers and poorly informed whistleblowers. This 
generates what is known as a “pooling” effect109: employees with weak 
information are treated the same as employees with strong information. 
The flat fee fails to separate good information from bad. 
Next, let’s consider the effects of making the payment to the 
whistleblower conditional upon a successful finding of fraud. Under both 
the FCA and the DFA, the whistleblower is entitled to a portion of the 
damages that the government receives. Making payment conditional upon 
success can operate as a screen. Informants with high-quality information 
will be incentivized to bring their information to the attention of the 
government agency. On the other hand, informants with weak information 
will be less inclined to blow the whistle, because the expected benefits are 
lower.
110
 The expected benefit is a function of the likelihood of success 
and individuals with strong information, therefore, have a higher expected 
reward than individuals with weak information. The government is able to 
 
 
 108. Our model assumes that individuals receive a signal before coming forward as a 
whistleblower. We assume that a fabricated signal can easily be identified as such and penalties for 
fraud will deter such behavior. The key is that the weak signal, from the government’s view, might be 
a strong signal. The same is not true when individuals receive no signal.  
 109. In game-theory literature pooling occurs when different types of individuals behave the same 
way. Here, those employees who receive a weak signal act the same way as those employees who 
receive a strong signal. See, e.g., JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 
282–92 (2001); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 
Ch. 9 &11 (4th ed. 2007); ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & JERRY R. GREEN, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY Ch. 13 (1995). 
 110. Whistleblowers know that the expected benefits are lower when the information is weak 
because, while the reward is the same for both types, the probability of winning the reward is much 
lower for whistleblowers with weaker information. 
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set up a screen that whistleblowers with strong information will clear, but 
whistleblowers with weak information will not. This generates a 
“separating” equilibrium.111  
But this separating equilibrium is not guaranteed by simply making the 
whistleblower’s payment contingent upon success. If the contingent 
payment is too low, then there will be a pooling equilibrium: no 
individuals will come forward. There will be, therefore, no deterrent effect 
of the whistle-blowing law and inefficient firms will continue to commit 
fraud. For example, let’s say in our model that the government offered a 
bounty of just one percent of any damages to the whistleblower. This will 
incentivize neither informants with weak information nor informants with 
strong information to come forward. Whistleblowers with strong 
information bear a cost of $250,000, but have an expected benefit of just 
one percent of $20,000,000 ($200,000). The expected bounty is not 
sufficiently high to incentivize whistle-blowing behavior. The expected 
reward for whistleblowers with weak information is even lower.
112
 The 
effect of a pooling equilibrium on the decision of a firm to commit fraud is 
clear. With no whistle-blowing behavior, inefficient firms are not deterred 
from engaging in fraudulent behavior.  
We can observe a separating equilibrium by increasing the reward. 
Under this equilibrium, only an informant with strong information will 
come forward. The expected benefits now outweigh the costs. An 
informant with weak information knows that the cost of blowing the 
whistle outweighs any expected cut of the damages from any successful 
fraud claim. Since only informants with high-quality information come 
forward, the government can focus its efforts on these claims of fraud. 
This increases the likelihood that an inefficient firm committing fraud will 
be caught.  
In our model, suppose that the government offers ten percent of any 
damages to the whistleblower. Whistleblowers with strong information 
have an expected reward of $2 million. This more than covers the cost of 
blowing the whistle. Whistleblowers with weak information, however, will 
not be induced to come forward. Those with weak information have only a 
ten percent chance of recovery and so they will value the chance of a 
 
 
 111. In game-theory literature, a separating equilibrium is where individuals of different types 
behave differently. Here, a separating equilibrium is desirable when those employees with strong 
information come forward; but those employees with weak information do not.  
 112. Here, a whistleblower with weak information has only a ten percent chance of success. The 
expected reward, therefore, for a whistleblower with weak information is ten percent x one percent x 
$20 million = $20,000. 
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reward at $200,000. Under the conditions of the model, only 
whistleblowers with strong information will come forward. 
This enhanced ability to screen information deters fraud. By increasing 
the likelihood of detection, inefficient firms are discouraged from acting 
dishonestly. No inefficient firm will commit fraud provided a sufficiently 
high proportion of employees of inefficient firms receive a strong 
signal.
113
  
The relationship between increasing rewards and increasing deterrence 
is not monotonic, however. If the rewards are too high, then 
whistleblowers with weak signals will be incentivized to come forward. 
For example, increasing the rewards can encourage disgruntled employees 
with poor information to blow the whistle in the hope of hitting the jackpot 
(recall that ten percent of weak signals will result in recovery). Once 
again, we have a pooling equilibrium; but this time, too many informants 
come forward.
114
 If the success-contingent payment to whistleblowers is 
too high, then the institutional structure begins to resemble the fixed-fee 
system described above.  
In our model, if a whistleblower is entitled to twenty-five percent of the 
damages awarded against the fraudulent firm then all employees who 
receive a signal—weak or strong—will come forward. Whistleblowers 
with weak information will come forward because the expected reward 
(ten percent of $5 million)
115
 exceeds the cost of blowing the whistle. As 
with the flat-fee incentive structure, the government cannot ex ante 
distinguish between well-informed whistleblowers and poorly informed 
whistleblowers. The regulator is faced with the problem of information 
overload. 
Excessive contingent payments not only dilute the quality of the 
information, but they have an ancillary effect of reducing the deterrence. 
We are left with a rather perverse result that increasing the rewards to 
potential whistleblowers can actually encourage firms to commit fraud. 
 
 
 113. Let’s say, for example, that an employee in fifty percent of inefficient firms receives a strong 
signal if fraud is actually committed. The agency, therefore, receives reports from fifty whistleblowers. 
All the whistleblowers that come forward received a strong signal. The likelihood of a fraudulent 
inefficient firm being investigated is, therefore, fifty percent. The expected cost of committing fraud, 
therefore, is $10 million (fifty percent of the $20 million damages), while the benefit is $6 million. No 
inefficient firm will commit fraud under these conditions. 
 114. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 21, at 1172. 
 115. To be clear, the expected reward is ten percent x twenty-five percent x $20 million = 
$500,000. This is greater than the cost incurred. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] NOISE REDUCTION: THE SCREENING VALUE OF QUI TAM 1197 
 
 
 
 
The argument, here, essentially follows from the idea that greater accuracy 
in the legal process generates greater deterrence.
116
 
These equilibria are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. If the reward is 
low (i.e., less than the threshold hurdle S), then no one will be incentivized 
to come forward. If the reward is increased to an amount between S and 
W, only informants with strong information come forward. This reward 
scheme deters fraud. Increasing the reward beyond the hurdle W, however, 
has deleterious effects. This incentivizes all whistleblowers to come 
forward and dilutes the quality of the information. This information 
overload reduces the deterrence effect and can produce greater incentive to 
commit fraud. 
More generally, assume that the damages awarded against the firm are 
D, the percentage awarded to the whistleblower is r, and the cost of 
blowing the whistle is c. The probability of victory in a particular claim 
against the firm is p and is known by the whistleblower. Under these 
assumptions, a whistleblower will be incentivized into blowing the whistle 
if r > c/pD. There are two types of informants—those with weak 
information with probability of victory pw, and those with strong 
information with probability of victory ps. The threshold percentage of 
damages required to encourage strong informants is S = c/psD. The 
threshold percentage of damages where weak informants will also be 
encouraged is W = c/pwD. It follows that W > S.
117
  
 
 
 116. This argument follows from a familiar result in the law and economics literature that the 
deterrent effect of law is reduced as the likelihood of inaccuracy in the legal system—either Type I or 
Type II errors—increases. As Type II errors—that is, the likelihood of a guilty party being found not 
guilty—increase, the likelihood of punishment is reduced. Therefore, parties are more likely to commit 
crimes. As Type I errors—that is, the likelihood of an innocent party being found guilty—increase, the 
relative cost of committing a crime is reduced. Therefore, parties are more likely to commit crimes. 
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 
191 (1996); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).  Here, in our model, we have only Type II errors. That is, inefficient and 
fraudulent firms are less likely to be found guilty of fraud when the regulator must randomize which 
firms to investigate because it has received too many tips. Given that they are less likely to be found 
guilty, the likelihood of committing fraud increases; this is in spite of the increase in the quantity of 
information flowing to the regulator.  
 117. Under our assumptions that D = $20 million, c = $250,000, pw = 0.1, and ps = 1, we get the 
following thresholds: S = 1/80 and W = 1/8. That is, if the whistleblower receives less than 1/80th of 
the $20 million damages, there is a pooling equilibrium: no one blows the whistle. If the whistleblower 
receives more than 1/8 of the damages, there is a pooling equilibrium: every employee who receives a 
signal blows the whistle. If the reward falls between these thresholds, only those with good 
information come forward. Such rewards optimize the deterrent effect of whistle-blowing. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
The deterrent effect of a whistleblower scheme is a function of the reward given to the 
whistleblower. If the reward is too high, it can reduce the deterrent effect. 
 
The impact that a pooling equilibrium has on enforcement and 
deterrence should not be underestimated. If the whistleblowers pool on the 
left side of Figure 1, then the government has no tips to use in 
investigating firms. The best the government can do is investigate 
randomly. This lowers enforcement to five percent and deters no fraud. If 
the whistleblowers pool on the right side of Figure 1, then everyone with a 
weak signal blows the whistle. A firm that commits fraud faces no 
sanction from being the subject of a tip. Because the government is 
overwhelmed with tips, it does not have the resources to differentiate 
strong tips from weak tips and chooses randomly from the tips. The 
whistleblower can do nothing to differentiate its tip as strong because the 
government does not have the resources to verify.  
Of course in the real world things are not so simple or binary. Some 
tips will be laughable. Others will be slam-dunks. But as long as there 
remains a large category of “plausible” cases, the lack of screening creates 
a cost. The government might look for indicia of strong tips. But as more 
tips come in, it will be harder to differentiate among the plausible tips, and 
it will be more costly for the government to examine the indicia closely. 
The measures will be more superficial, less verifiable, and more likely to 
produce false positives and false negatives.  
The Bernie Madoff scandal provides a demonstration of this exact 
phenomenon. Even before the DFA, the SEC’s limited resources required 
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them to be selective in choosing which tips to investigate. But their 
selection criteria were crude at best. Over nine years, Harry Markopolos 
provided the SEC with information about the Madoff scheme. The returns 
Madoff was achieving were unheard of. And at one point, Markopolos 
demonstrated that there were not enough options existing in the world for 
Madoff to be running the strategy he claimed. Madoff’s operations were 
mathematically impossible.
118
 
Mathematical impossibility, however, was not one of the SEC’s criteria 
for measuring the credibility of a tip. As Markopolos notes, the SEC 
basically determined, “the only way I would qualify as a whistleblower is 
if I came in with a tape recording of Bernie Madoff admitting he was 
running a Ponzi scheme . . . . Obviously, I didn’t have that tape, and if I 
did I wouldn’t have needed the SEC.”119  
b. Reducing the Cost of Blowing the Whistle 
Individuals seeking to blow the whistle on fraudulent behavior may 
bear a high private cost of blowing the whistle. For example, the 
whistleblower may be threatened with retaliation that can come in the 
form of reduced opportunities for promotion, losing their job, or perhaps 
even threatened with criminal proceedings for their part in the fraudulent 
behavior. 
Consider the following two examples. First, a group of eleven 
employees and former employees of the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) complained in letters to Congress that the FDA uses intimidation 
and coercion tactics in order to gain approval for unsafe or defective 
medical devices used to screen for cancer. These allegations were 
published on the front page of the New York Times.
120
 Six of the 
whistleblowers subsequently brought a claim in the federal courts alleging 
that the FDA retaliated by unlawfully reading e-mails and, in some cases, 
terminating employment.
121
  
 
 
 118. Oversight of the SEC’s Failure to Identify the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How to 
Improve SEC Performance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 30, 60 (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos); Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and 
Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5, 101 (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos). 
 119. Interview by Steve Inskeep with Harry Markopolos (Mar. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124208012. 
 120. Harris Gardiner, Scientists Say F.D.A. Ignored Warnings on Radiation Exposure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at A14. 
 121. Second Amended Complaint, Paul Hardy v. Margaret Hamburg, No. 1:11-CV-01739-RLW 
(D.D.C. July 17, 2012). 
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Second, in light of a report that soccer referees had been fixing soccer 
matches in China, the Chinese Football Association offered amnesty and 
anonymity to any corrupt referees who admitted match-fixing behavior.
122
 
The chief referee, Gong Jianping, came forward and detailed the links 
between soccer officials, referees, and illegal gambling rings. The Chinese 
Football Association went against their word; they had Gong Jianping 
arrested and he was sentenced to ten years in prison. He died eighteen 
months later.
123
  
Such potential costs of retaliation, no doubt, loom large in the decision 
of the individual to blow the whistle. The larger these costs, the less likely 
individuals will be to blow the whistle. A common argument in both the 
legal academic literature and popular press is that the government can 
further cultivate and encourage whistle-blowing by guaranteeing 
anonymity of the informant and preventing any possible retaliation against 
the whistleblower.
124
 Protecting whistleblowers against such retaliation 
undoubtedly has the effect of encouraging whistle-blowing.
125
 But the 
protection may reduce the ability of the regulator to screen the quality of 
the information—at least when the level of the reward and other costs are 
not considered or adjusted when designing the protection. 
 
 
 122. There is an extensive, game-theoretic literature on the use of leniency to encourage 
whistleblowers to come forward. The literature is largely situated in the antitrust arena, where leniency 
is given when a whistleblower informs about other members of a price-fixing cartel. The use of 
leniency is sensible in this context because of the instability of any cartel. See, e.g., Cécile Aubert, 
Patrick Rey, & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on 
Cartels, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241 (2006); Wouter P.J. Wils, Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: 
Theory and Practice, 30 WORLD COMPETITION 25 (2007). But see Edward M. Iacobucci, Cartel Class 
Actions and Immunity Programmes, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013). Leniency may not have 
the same effect in the context of fraud as it does in the context of antitrust. First, the equilibria of 
fraudulent behavior are not inherently unstable, as it is in a cartel. Second, the leniency provisions only 
work if the whistleblower can be protected against prosecution or other state punishment. In the 
context of the FCA and the DFA, the individual whistleblower may not have committed any fraudulent 
or dishonest act; there may be nothing that a leniency or immunity program could do to incentivize 
coming forward. 
 123. See, e.g., DECLAN HILL, THE FIX: SOCCER AND ORGANIZED CRIME 15 (2008). 
 124. See, e.g., Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 
WM. & MARY POL’Y REV., Spring 2012, at 184; ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLE-BLOWING: WHEN 
IT WORKS—AND WHY (2003). For an example of recent media reports on drug use in Australian sport, 
see also Adam Cooper, Whistleblowers Need Anonymity, THE AGE NEWSPAPER (Feb. 10, 2013), 
available at http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/whistleblowers-need-anonymity-20130209-2e5d1. 
html.  
 125. The idea of the need to protect federal employees who blow the whistle and report agency 
misconduct from such retaliation is the basis of the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-12, § 2, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (“The purpose of this Act is to strengthen and improve protection 
for the rights of Federal employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the 
Government . . . .”). 
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The private costs that whistleblowers bear play a vital role in 
generating a separating equilibrium. To see why, let’s return to our model. 
We previously assumed that the cost of bringing the information to the 
attention of the government agency is $250,000. But, let’s say the 
government seeks to further encourage whistle-blowing by reducing this 
private cost. This lowers the hurdle that whistleblowers have to clear to 
come forward with their information. If the government can guarantee 
anonymity of the whistleblower and guarantee that there will be no 
retaliation against the employee, then the costs may even fall to zero. 
Decreasing the private cost of blowing the whistle has two effects. 
First, it will encourage strong whistleblowers as the threshold S, in Figure 
1, decreases. That is, whistleblowers with strong signals will be induced 
by smaller rewards. Second, it can encourage too many whistleblowers. In 
Figure 1, the threshold W also decreases. With a low cost of blowing the 
whistle, more informants with weak signals will be encouraged to come 
forward.  
Reducing the cost of blowing the whistle to zero eliminates any 
possibility of a separating equilibrium in our model. The threshold W in 
Figure 1 will be located at 0. If whistleblowers receive any expected 
benefit from coming forward—no matter how small—they blow the 
whistle. This is true for employees with either weak or strong information. 
Thus, reward schemes that allow whistleblowers to anonymously report 
information to the regulator, such as that under the DFA, may merely 
dilute the quality of the information and consequently fail to deter fraud.  
In a perfect world, we could maximize the value of a screen by making 
it costless for whistleblowers with strong information to come forward 
while making it costly for whistleblowers with weak information. This 
world of perfect separation does not exist. If, however, the costs of 
blowing the whistle on non-meritorious claims were greater than the costs 
of blowing the whistle on meritorious claims, then the likelihood of a 
separating equilibrium increases. Loss-contingent costs can achieve this. 
The effect of loss-contingent costs is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
threshold W increases from W0 to W1. This increases the gap between 
S   and  W.  If  we  represent  the  loss-contingent costs  by  k, then W1 is  
(c + (1–pw).k)/pwD. This is clearly greater than W0.
126
 If the costs of 
bringing forward information are borne disproportionately by 
whistleblowers that received weak signals, the deterrent effect on fraud is 
 
 
 126. If 1-ps > 0 , then S will also shift to the right as well. The shift, however, will be less than the 
shift in W. Now, S1 will be (c + (1–ps).k)/psD. The change in S is δS/δk = (1–ps)/psD, which is 
unambiguously smaller than the change in W, δW/δk = (1–pw)/pwD. 
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stronger. In the next sub-section, we set out the argument that this is 
exactly what the FCA qui tam mechanism provides. 
FIGURE 2 
 
If costs are contingent on bringing unsuccessful claims, the likelihood of a 
separating equilibrium increases. 
c. The Screening Benefits of Qui Tam Actions under the FCA 
Qui tam actions under the FCA present three, additional screening 
opportunities over blowing the whistle directly to the regulating agency. 
First, there are costs of bringing suit in court. Second, these additional 
costs of bringing a qui tam action are more likely to be borne by parties 
who have weak information. Third, plaintiffs’ lawyers who work on 
contingency fees will act as an additional screen
127
 on the quality of 
 
 
 127. Pamela Bucy has emphasized a related point. She argues that the complexity and cost of 
prosecuting an FCA case will discourage inexperienced counsel from taking these cases. Bucy, supra 
note 10, at 58. This is a different form of screening. It is not clear, however, why this would be true. 
An inexperienced lawyer faced with a strong signal for an FCA case would stand to receive an 
enormous return on her effort. While plaintiffs may tend to choose more experienced lawyers, that 
result should be expected in most areas of litigation. David Freeman Engstrom’s work suggests the 
methods of selecting attorneys and the qualities of success are more complicated. Engstrom finds that 
“certain repeat players—namely former DOJ prosecutors turned private sector relator counsel—are far 
more likely to persuade the DOJ to exercise its powerful authority under the FCA to intervene in qui 
tam cases and push them to resolution.” Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1251. But he also finds that they 
are involved in a small number of cases and achieve lower returns for the government than other 
successful cases. Id. at 1251–52. 
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information that is brought forward.
128
 This third argument has been made 
in the literature discussing the merits of contingency fees more 
generally.
129
 We will, therefore, restrict our analysis to the first two 
arguments.
130
  
Qui tam actions are costly. Above, we argued that whistleblowers bear 
a large private cost from truncated career opportunities. There are two, 
additional types of cost that must be borne by plaintiffs under the FCA that 
informants who report directly to the regulator do not have to pay. First, 
there are upfront costs. There are significant costs of hiring attorneys, 
filing costs, and substantiating claims. The plaintiff will expend a great 
deal of time, effort, and energy. Under the FCA, the plaintiff must prove to 
the judge that he has cleared a number of statutory hurdles. Additionally, 
as with any lawsuit, the plaintiff must meet minimum pleading 
requirements.
131
 These will be greater than the requirements of providing a 
tip to the SEC.
132
 The pleading requirement costs will likely deter potential 
 
 
 128. The plaintiff will need to expend resources to convince the lawyer that the signal is a good 
one. This cost is not worth expending if the signal is weak, but it is if the signal is strong. As we see 
below, qui tam litigation introduces several of these case development screening points: (1) the lawyer 
screens; (2) the court screens on a motion to dismiss; and (3) the DOJ screens in making its decision to 
proceed. At each point, the plaintiff is undertaking costs that are likely to be wasted if the signal is 
weak. 
 129. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter KRITZER, RISKS]; Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997); 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Susan Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24 
RAND J. ECON. 343 (1993); William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement 
30–31 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 446; Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 663, Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360723. 
 130. It is worth noting though that the role of contingency fee lawyers will not be nearly as 
important in the DFA context. First, the need to retain counsel in making a tip under the DFA is much 
lower. The primary benefit is that it ensures anonymity. But that role should be significantly smaller 
than the role of the lawyer in the FCA context. Second, the cost to the lawyer of advising on a weak 
anonymous tip under the DFA is negligible especially when compared to the costs of filing an FCA 
suit. Lawyers should be expected to do less screening in the DFA context. 
 131. Generally, a plaintiff may be able to signal the strength of their case to the defendant at the 
pleadings stage of proceedings in civil suits. William Hubbard notes: “through factually detailed 
pleading . . . a plaintiff communicates the strength of her case . . . .” See Hubbard, supra note 129, at 5. 
 132. The SEC cannot realistically impose similar “pleading requirements” for tips. The SEC 
would have an incentive to declare all tips insufficient and then investigate the case anyway, keeping 
the recovery and not paying the tip. If, on the other hand, the SEC committed to pay whenever there is 
a recovery, the pleading requirement would be meaningless. The qui tam mechanism makes it difficult 
for a plaintiff’s lawyer or the DOJ to reject a tip and continue with the case. And the court lacks the 
internal incentive to dismiss the case to squeeze out the whistleblower because it receives none of the 
recovery. 
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plaintiffs from filing suit,
133
 but, as noted above, this increase can bolster 
the screening effect. In Figure 1, these upfront costs shift both 
thresholds—S and W—to the right.134 
Second, the costs incurred by whistleblowers under the FCA 
mechanism are disproportionately borne by whistleblowers with weak 
information. That is, some costs are only borne by parties who lose in 
court. For example, under the FCA the court can award costs (such as 
attorney’s fees, etc.) to the successful side.135 This acts like a fine on the 
losing whistleblower. While fee-shifting arrangements are not unique to 
FCA litigation,
136
 as a practical matter fee shifting is almost unheard of in 
out-of-court whistle-blowing schemes. In theory, the DFA would look 
much more like the FCA if there was a fee (or fine) imposed on tipsters 
who do not prevail. But it may be difficult to implement. Allowing the 
SEC to fine the whistleblower for a failed investigation when the 
whistleblower had no control over the investigation introduces complex 
moral hazard problems. This determination would have to be adjudicated 
by a third party—most likely a court. As a practical matter, we can expect 
the court to defer almost entirely to the SEC in the decision to pursue an 
investigation. And even if the court steps in, the whistleblower should only 
prevail if it shows that the investigation should have been successful. That 
litigation in turn will look a great deal like the litigation that the 
whistleblowers undertake in the first place in the qui tam system. A world 
where we have tips directly to an agency who investigates but then we 
employ a court to determine the value of the reward, the quality of the tip, 
the propriety of pursuing the tip, and the costs imposed on the losing 
 
 
 133. Law and economics theory on the decision to file suit is summarized in RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593–639 (7th ed. 2003); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 388–444 (4th ed. 2004); and Shavell, supra note 99, at 389–418. 
 134. In the more general model, it can be easily shown that increasing c, the upfront, private cost 
of blowing the whistle, will result in both S = c/psD and W = c/pwD shifting to the right. 
 135. On the effects of “English fees” and “American fees,” see generally MARY FRANCIS 
DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1995), which describes, 
generally, the use of fee shifting; see also Peter van Wijck & Ben van Velthoven, An Economic 
Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs, 9 EUR. J.L. & ECON., 
Mar. 2000, at 115; Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, & John Panzar, An Economic Analysis of 
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 173 (1984); John C. 
Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); 
Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? 3 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 143 (1987), and H.S.E. Gravelle, The Efficiency Implications of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1993). See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, 
in 3 HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1732–33 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002) (providing a brief survey of the law and economics literature on fee shifting); see also Ferziger 
& Currell, supra note 21. 
 136. Engstrom makes this important critique of our analysis. See Engstrom, supra note 52. 
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tipster, begins to look like a Rube Goldberg version of a qui tam 
mechanism. 
More fundamentally, under the FCA, the Department of Justice 
investigates claims made by the whistleblower that has brought suit and 
elects whether or not to join the case as co-plaintiff. This imposes two 
costs—one that is fixed and one that is contingent on the quality of the 
information.  
The fixed cost is the cost of convincing the DOJ that the case is strong. 
The DOJ acts as a screen in this way. The DOJ will typically join a strong 
case; they will not join a weak case. The plaintiff is incurring significant 
costs to develop the case while the DOJ is considering whether to join. 
The DOJ’s “investigation” often entails simply reviewing the results of the 
plaintiff’s discovery. Thus, the plaintiff incurs the cost to demonstrate the 
strength of its case. This cost is likely to be wasted if the plaintiff knows 
that its signal is weak. This is analogous to the costs of convincing the 
contingent-fee lawyer, and convincing the judge at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage. The DOJ will, however, require a greater level of proof to join the 
case than the judge. In practice, it appears that these costs are real and 
function as a strong screen. The federal government has, historically, been 
a very good judge of the strength of a case following a preliminary 
investigation.
137
 When the DOJ joins a whistleblower in suit, the plaintiff 
wins in approximately ninety-five percent of cases; when the DOJ does 
not, the plaintiff wins in just five percent of cases.
138
  
As an additional cost that is contingent on the strength of the signal, 
when the DOJ joins the suit the remaining costs of suit are borne by the 
government. In cases where the DOJ does not join, the whistleblower 
(presumably with a weak case) must bear the litigation costs. This has the 
effect of further encouraging informants with strong information, while 
further discouraging informants with weak information. Such contingent 
costs
139
 have the effect of shifting W further to the right, increasing the 
likelihood of a separating equilibrium.
140
 
Qui tam actions under the FCA, therefore, provide a key institutional 
advantage over whistleblowers reporting directly to a regulator. Litigation 
 
 
 137. An alternative explanation for the difference in success rates is that the government is a good 
litigator, and not necessarily a good judge of the merits of a case. Our model assumes away differences 
in litigation quality, merely focusing on informational quality.  
 138. See Kwok, supra note 10, at 6. 
 139. This cost is not purely “loss-contingent” but rather contingent upon the weakness of the 
signal after the case has been partially developed. This has the same beneficial effect. 
 140. As noted above, with loss-contingent costs, k, the threshold for weak informants is 
W1 = (c + (1–pw).k)/pwD. 
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forces individuals who blow the whistle to bear an upfront cost. Further, 
the costs of litigation are greater as the probability of winning falls. This 
discourages whistleblowers that know that they have poor information 
from coming forward, thereby discouraging overzealous or non-
meritorious claims.  
With similar effect the SEC might require a bond for tips. This is the 
same as the fee-shifting fine discussed above. In some cases, the bond 
might achieve the same outcome. But in others it might create perverse 
incentives for the SEC in choosing between investigating good tips and 
just keeping the bond.
141
  
There are, of course, some qualifications to this screening benefit. We 
have made some assumptions that, if relaxed, will dampen our results. 
First, we assumed that informants have perfect knowledge of the quality of 
their claim. Any uncertainty in the knowledge, however, will likely 
weaken the positive effects. While whistleblowers may have good 
information about the nature of the fraud, they may not be able to 
determine the likelihood of success in courts. Cases of fraud can be highly 
complex and this may reduce the likelihood that individuals blow the 
whistle even when the merits of the case are very strong. Second, we have 
assumed that individuals here are risk neutral. If individuals are risk 
averse, though, loss-contingent costs may over deter individuals from 
bringing claims. Qui tam actions represent a significant risk; 
whistleblowers gamble the cost of suit and future employment 
opportunities against possible gains.
142
 This would deter individuals with 
strong information who are averse to risk.
143
  
The screening benefits of the FCA mechanism are not found in the new 
whistle-blowing regime under the DFA. The DFA mechanism seeks to 
encourage whistle-blowing by both increasing the rewards available to 
whistleblowers and reducing the cost of blowing the whistle. The loss-
contingent costs associated with blowing the whistle by bringing suit are 
missing from the DFA. Encouraging whistle-blowing by allowing 
anonymous reporting to the SEC without substituting in other costs, will 
encourage weaker information, resulting in information overload for the 
regulator. 
 
 
 141. See supra note 132, for why it would be difficult for the SEC to impose a similar upfront cost 
without involving a qui tam mechanism. 
 142. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 119. 
 143. On the concept of risk aversion in the context of litigation, see Shavell, supra note 99, at 
406–7. On the concepts of risk neutrality and risk aversion more generally, see ROBERT S. PINDYCK & 
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 165–70 (7th ed. 2009).  
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One might imagine that if anonymity were not provided, the cost would 
increase to a level that made it unnecessary to impose other costs. On the 
other hand, it might be possible to offer anonymity in the FCA context 
without sacrificing screening because costs are imposed through litigation. 
That may or may not be feasible. The key takeaway is that costs cannot be 
set haphazardly. And the near zero costs that the DFA is designed to 
provide will not provide any meaningful screening. 
In the end, the optimal reward-cost structure will, of course, depend on 
many features. We know, though, that the SEC was receiving a high 
number of complaints prior to the DFA whistle-blowing regime. The 
problem was not a low volume of available whistleblowers.
144
 Rather, if 
there was a problem, it was one of screening for quality.
145
 Our theory 
suggests the mechanism implemented under the DFA will therefore be 
counter-productive in deterring fraud. 
III. BROADER APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The fact that the above analysis focuses on fraud on the government 
(FCA) and violations of securities laws (DFA) is not an inherent limitation 
on the screening value of qui tam mechanisms. It is a function of the 
magnitude and recent high profile of these two whistleblower programs. 
As we have noted, whistleblower mechanisms are also used by the IRS to 
detect tax fraud. Private suits on behalf of the government and other 
whistle-blowing measures were widely used in English criminal law 
before public police forces.
146
 Qui tam suits have been used in intellectual 
property law
147
 and elsewhere.
148
 Previous literature has noted the 
 
 
 144. Denise Voigt Crawford, former head of the Texas Securities Commission, made this point in 
testimony before the Committee on Financial Services of the United States House of Representatives. 
Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Invest Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private 
Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 111th Cong. 84 (2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/ 
printed%20hearings/111-84.pdf (“Well, the problem isn’t that people weren’t complaining to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. They receive I think about 750,000 complaints a year. The 
problem is that they were ignoring them or at least not making good determinations with regard to 
those complaints that really needed to be followed up on.”). 
 145. Cf. Madoff discussion, supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 146. See J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800, at 50–55 (1986) 
(discussing the use of rewards, sometimes ad hoc and sometimes by statute, to obtain information 
leading to apprehension of criminals). 
 147. See, e.g., False Marking Act that allowed qui tam actions on behalf of the government. 35 
U.S.C. § 292 (2012). These qui tam provisions were, however, recently struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal district court. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 813 
F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Ohio 2011).  
 148. For example, there are qui tam-like provisions allowing for private suits regarding violations 
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importance of whistleblower mechanisms when there is hidden 
information and the government wishes to extract this private information. 
Our analysis suggests that when there are sticky asymmetric information 
problems—which is, of course, the definition of hidden information—the 
screening mechanism is important. We have illustrated the benefit of a qui 
tam mechanism over other whistleblower schemes in screening low-
quality information from high-quality information. 
That is not to say, however, that the qui tam mechanism is always the 
silver bullet for rooting out hidden information; there may be other ways 
to impose costs on whistleblowers. There are several limitations that our 
model suggests should restrict the expansion of whistleblower rewards 
generally and qui tam mechanisms in particular. In this part, we discuss 
these limitations as well as areas where expansion will be valuable. 
A. Limitation One: Ulterior Motives 
The screening properties of qui tam are important insofar as they deter 
firms from engaging in fraudulent behavior. Excessive rewards and 
promises of anonymity are blunt instruments for encouraging whistle-
blowing and deterring fraud. By themselves, the instruments are blunt 
because they focus on the quantity of information rather than the quality. 
The ability of the government regulator to parse out meritorious claims 
from non-meritorious claims is tightly linked to the deterrent value of 
whistle-blowing.  
The question of which tools to use to optimally deter dishonest 
behavior may turn on the type of fraudulent activity that the government is 
seeking to deter. So far we have bracketed issues regarding claims about 
the types of motivations that drive whistleblowers. A long literature has 
explored the non-pecuniary interests that may drive whistle-blowing.
149
 
Our model focuses on financial incentives. Rewards must be high enough 
(relative to costs) to attract high-quality tips but costs must also be high 
enough (relative to rewards) to screen out low-quality tips. Further, if costs 
are increasingly contingent on outcome, then higher costs will screen out 
low-quality information without deterring high-quality tips.  
In other areas of regulation, however, potential whistleblowers may not 
be as incentivized as our rational-actor model suggests. The government 
must still contend with the problem of hidden information and the quality 
 
 
of Native American protection laws, see 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2006), and regarding arming vessels against 
a “friendly nation.” See 18 U.S.C. § 962 (2006). 
 149. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010). 
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of the information provided. In these cases where financial rewards are 
unlikely to be a strong factor in the decision of the whistleblower, then 
mechanisms that reduce the private cost of blowing the whistle will be of 
greater salience (assuming there are wealth constraints even for the 
morally motivated). Anonymity and other measures that reduce the cost of 
informing will be more effective tools for increasing the quantity of 
information here. On the flip side, lower monetary rewards—even zero 
rewards—may actually be correlated with higher quality information than 
large financial rewards. That is, if we assume the morally motivated are 
likely to have stronger information in an area than the financially 
motivated, we may not need to use rewards, but may simply seek to lower 
those costs that may deter altruistic and wealth-constrained 
whistleblowers. The moral payout substitutes for the monetary payout and 
is potentially contingent itself on the quality of the information. This will 
be the case if those who only come forward where their moral sensitivities 
have been breached do so with more credible information.
150
  
There are other non-pecuniary motives that may present problems. 
Individuals may come forward because they are seeking revenge. Revenge 
can be difficult. On the one hand, like morality, it may be a substitute for 
monetary rewards.
151
 On the other hand, the revenge payout may not be 
correlated with the quality of information. A terminated employee may be 
happy to see her employer punished regardless of whether the employer 
committed any fraud. Thus, the information brought forward by 
 
 
 150. In reality, of course, individuals may blow the whistle for a variety of non-financial reasons. 
Take, for example, the case of three Canadian scientists working for Health Canada, the Canadian 
government agency with responsibilities similar to those of the Food and Drug Administration in the 
United States. In 1998, Dr. Shiv Chopra, Dr. Margaret Hayden, and Dr. Gerard Lambert blew the 
whistle on what they alleged to be dishonest, drug approval processes for bovine growth hormone. 
They contended that the long-term effects on cows and the effects on humans were inadequately tested 
and that they were being pressured to approve the drug. These whistleblowers did not come forward 
because of financial incentives. Rather, they were concerned for the integrity of the drug approval 
system. All three whistleblowers lost their job. See Whistleblowers: Moment of Truth (CBC television 
broadcast Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2012-2013/whistleblowers-
moment-of-truth. 
 151. In unemployment benefit fraud, for example, the Australian government authority 
responsible for distributing unemployment benefits and social security benefits (CentreLink) received, 
on average, 2,115 phone calls each week from informants providing tip-offs as to recipients receiving 
more than their entitlement. The information was given anonymously; none of the informants was paid 
any money at all. In 2010, this information led to over 43,000 cases being reviewed and 7,954 
payments being reduced (a success rate of under 20% of investigations). The anonymous 
whistleblower scheme saved the Australian government over $2.3 million. Renee Viellaris, Number of 
Australians Dobbing in Welfare Cheats Reaches All-Time High, THE SUNDAY MAIL (May 22, 2011, 
12:00 AM), http://www.news.com.au/national-old/number-of-australians-dobbing-in-welfare-cheats-
reaches-all-time-high/story-e6frfkvr-1226060326917. 
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informants merely to generate bad publicity for the regulated firm may be 
of lower quality. In those contexts, mechanism design is more 
complicated. The interplay between costs, monetary rewards, and a 
revenge motive is difficult to intuit or test.
152
 
While these considerations may be prevalent elsewhere, we suspect 
they do not loom large in the DFA context. First, in the context of 
financial regulation, potential whistleblowers who work in the finance 
industry are likely to be highly motivated by financial incentives.
153
 
Second, the financially-motivated-rational-actor model has generally 
proven to be a stronger indicator of behavior of whistleblowers than other 
explanations in the context of fraudulent behavior in business.
154
 
B. Limitation Two: Asymmetry of Information 
The results of our model rely on the assumption that the individual 
whistleblower has superior information to the government. This idea of 
asymmetric information underpins the legal elements in whistleblower 
statutes requiring that the information not be publicly disclosed or that the 
whistleblower be an “original source”155 of independent knowledge.156 
These requirements generally prevent people from coming forward to 
collect on information that is already public and in the hands of those who 
can use the information properly. This limits the effect of the statutes to 
scenarios with asymmetric information. 
 
 
 152. Other motivators may exist. And it may be important to distinguish altruism, indignation, 
anger, and revenge. These and many other nuanced behavioral motivations may have a wide range of 
varying correlation with accuracy. The “how’s my driving” anonymous tipster programs might be 
prime examples of the usefulness and influence of non-monetary incentives in encouraging the 
reporting of accurate asymmetric information. These are discussed both theoretically and empirically 
in the work of Lior Strahilevitz. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and 
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006); David S. Abrams and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Do More 
Eyes on the Road Mean Better Driving? A Field Experiment (Univ. of Pa. & Univ. of Chi., Working 
Paper, Jan. 21, 2013), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_ 
name=ALEA2013&paper_id=308. This area of study may provide fertile ground for testing the 
dynamic interplay of various incentives in whistleblowing. 
 153. Engstrom reaches as similar conclusion but on different grounds: “Lower moral 
disapprobation in [the areas of tax, securities and procurement fraud] means that regulators cannot rely 
on an underlying moralistic proclivity to report wrongdoing. Nor is there a substantial risk of crowd-
out, as there is little moralistic motivation to report wrongdoing in the first place.” Engstrom, supra 
note 52 (footnote omitted). 
 154. For a more comprehensive discussion of the literature on financial rewards of 
whistleblowers, see Dyck et al., supra note 18.  
 155. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). 
 156. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B)(2). 
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We noted in Part I that justifications of the qui tam mechanism based 
on regulatory capture of agencies ignored this distinction. Agency capture 
and the need to solve it are not unique to whistleblower allegations. But 
asymmetric information is. And that is why a central value of the qui tam 
mechanism is its ability to screen information.  
The upshot is that qui tam mechanisms—or mechanisms that resemble 
or mimic qui tam mechanisms—may be less valuable or more problematic 
if applied to scenarios without asymmetric private information but large 
agency costs. Though not explicitly a qui tam mechanism, in the law of 
corporations the shareholders’ derivative suit may pose this type of 
scenario.
157
 The derivative lawsuit is a mechanism for a shareholder to 
bring suit (at least in theory) on behalf of the corporation (usually, but not 
necessarily, against the current or former directors or officers of the 
corporation).
158
 It is essentially a qui tam procedure where the derivative 
plaintiff’s attorney fills the role of “whistleblower” and receives the 
(sometimes quite hefty) reward.
159
  
But derivative suits are generally not ones where the plaintiff has 
hidden information that needs to be coaxed out.
160
 Indeed, Delaware courts 
have, for decades, lamented that it is usually quite the opposite.
161
 
Justifications for derivative suits instead focus primarily on the agency 
problem. Unlike FCA and DFA whistleblower cases, the source of the 
plaintiff’s knowledge is irrelevant. But the existence of a conflict of 
interest is paramount. A derivative plaintiff with original hidden 
information will nonetheless be precluded (by way of the demand 
requirement) from bringing suit where the directors are deemed to have no 
 
 
 157. We view class actions as a different category altogether dealing with much broader problems 
of coordination and collective action. We do not address those here. 
 158. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (a seminal case on derivative litigation 
and the procedural demand requirements imposed on derivative plaintiffs). 
 159. The attorneys in Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012), received 
fees of $304 million in a derivative suit. That is an outlier, but fees for successful cases are substantial. 
 160. For a more general discussion of the economics of derivative suits, see FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 100–02 
(1991). 
 161. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (lamenting the failure of derivative 
plaintiffs in using statutory tools such as DGCL § 220 to request to inspect the books and records that 
are in possession of the board directors—whose members are usually the defendants—to obtain 
information to verify if they can meet the pleading requirements in a derivative suit); South v. Baker, 
62 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has admonished stockholders repeatedly to use 
Section 220 of the General Corporation Law to obtain books and records and investigate their claims 
before filing suit.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1212 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1169 
 
 
 
 
conflict
162
 and a derivative plaintiff suing on public information will be 
allowed to proceed if she can show the directors are not impartial.
163
  
Derivative suits certainly have not been praised as the gold standard for 
rooting out corporate misbehavior. And our analysis above suggests that 
the mechanism is ill designed. A qui tam like mechanism, in a world 
without a central problem of asymmetric information,
164
 is raising costs 
and rewards needlessly. The lure of hefty fees attracts more and more 
claims. In response, the courts have continued to ratchet up the cost side of 
the equation with strict demand requirements, special committees 
empowered to dismiss suits, the imposition of pre-filing requirements, and 
the like. As these costs increase, plaintiffs require higher rewards to bring 
even the strongest cases. In turn, the fees awarded to attorneys for those 
best cases have to go up.  
This suggests the corporate governance setting may be precisely the 
case (as opposed to true whistleblower situations) where a DFA 
mechanism—where shareholders file grievances to an outside agency that 
pursues violations of corporate governance—would be optimal.165 The 
derivative procedure with its qui tam quality is poorly designed, given the 
problem it addresses. It is not effective screening to artificially raise costs 
for parties who have no private information. Most of these cases start with 
public disclosures or news reports. Plaintiffs’ lawyers then race to be the 
first to overcome the court-imposed hurdles. This race provides no new 
information to the corporation or its other shareholders. In a weak attempt 
to make the process more effective, courts have insisted that plaintiffs 
make a request to see the books and records of the corporation so they can 
look for wrongdoing and conflict. This is a fairly pointless mechanism. 
 
 
 162. To put it simply, the derivative plaintiff must first make demand on the directors to cause the 
corporation to bring the suit. The only way around this is for the plaintiff to show that demand was 
futile because the directors are conflicted and not impartial in making the decision. See Grimes, 673 
A.2d 1207. If the plaintiff makes demand, and it is refused, the plaintiff faces a very high burden of 
showing that demand was wrongfully rejected. 
 163. See Aronson, 473 A.2d 805; Grimes, 673 A.2d 1207. 
 164. Of course, it might be different if these suits were being brought by inside employees rather 
than outside shareholders. That would look much more like the cases that the DFA is directed at. But 
only shareholders have standing to bring derivative suits. And the overwhelming bulk of cases are 
brought by outside shareholders not employees who own shares. 
 165. Another option that has been explored elsewhere would be to have outside law firms bid for 
the right to pursue the case. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (proposing an auction system of choosing counsel); Randall S. Thomas & 
Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. 
L. REV. 423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: A Rejoinder, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: 
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002). 
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Plaintiffs’ lawyers have no special talent for reviewing books and records 
and the information in those books and records is controlled and filtered 
by the very directors and officers who are alleged to have a conflict. 
The whole process imposes a cost on the corporation and the plaintiffs 
while providing no real screening or signaling. As costs increase, the 
rewards (in fees) have to increase to keep the plaintiffs in the game. As a 
result, fees are high but cases are extremely costly to bring. This is a waste 
that is designed to deal with the wrong problem. 
This cycle of raising costs and damages has little screening effect. In 
some sense, all of the potential plaintiffs have the same signal based on 
public reports. Some cases are good and some are bad, but the plaintiffs 
have no way of knowing. As long as the odds are good, they bring a 
portfolio of cases fishing for the big one. Because the signal remains 
constant, moving the cost or benefit thresholds does nothing to alter the 
quality of the pool. If anything, moving both thresholds up just favors risk 
seeking firms, firms with larger portfolios of cases, or firms with liquidity 
advantages that can invest more in overcoming the upfront hurdles. 
Here, where the problem is real agency capture and not hidden 
information, an independent agency that responds to information (public 
reports and tips) and rewards tips with a small (perhaps even fixed) reward 
should reduce costs significantly and address agency problems more 
directly.
166
 
C. Limitation Three: Public vs. Private Screening 
The corporate governance case just discussed might be viewed as a 
pseudo-public mechanism. These are private entities, but the shares are 
widely held and the benefits of any action are spread across millions of 
shares. But what about true private settings? Surely, asymmetric 
information is a problem that faces private firms in their dealings with 
employees and counterparties. 
If the screening value of qui tam is so strong, should we allow parties 
to stand in the shoes and bring suits on behalf of other private parties? For 
example, let’s say that there are two employees of IBM and one employee 
has strong private information that the other has committed fraud against 
IBM: Does our model suggest that it would be beneficial for the whistle-
 
 
 166. The history of Delaware derivative cases demonstrates that outside tips and information will 
generally not have great value. Complaints are often filled with nothing but a recitation of public 
information—or worse, an exact copy of a complaint in another proceeding. The purpose of tips would 
just be to bring lower-profile public information to the agencies attention.  
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blowing employee to take a private action on behalf of IBM against the 
fraudulent employee? We should be careful to acknowledge the limits of 
the theory.  
Qui tam is a solution when the problem of information asymmetry is 
great and is intractable; it should be used only when the information 
asymmetry is difficult to resolve not when the information can be cheaply 
verified. The cost of unpacking the truth about fraud against the 
government can be great, given the scale and scope of government 
operations. Similarly, the cost of the government detecting corporate 
securities fraud is high.
167
 It is not clear that informational problems 
cannot be overcome in the private-party situation with lower cost by using 
other mechanisms. To continue with our IBM example: IBM would have 
its own internal structure for dealing with fraudulent behavior by an 
employee against the company. Allowing qui tam type suits here may 
undermine these internal mechanisms.  
The same may not be true, however, if IBM is worried about its 
contracts with outsiders. If a third-party supplier is defrauding IBM, it may 
very much want to reward employees of that supplier for bringing suit on 
its behalf. Presumably, such a system would allow firms to opt in or out of 
any mechanism. For example, IBM might not care enough about small 
fraud that was immaterial to its profit reporting at an unimportant vendor. 
But the opposite might be true for its largest suppliers, distributors or 
retailers. A system could be developed for a firm to opt into a public 
system where certain claims against certain parties could be brought on its 
behalf. We would expect to see this opt-in behavior where the 
relationships are important and the asymmetry is both large and 
intractable. 
All of that said, such proposals start to run into other areas of 
theoretical concern that we must reserve for another day. Chief among 
those is the theoretical and empirical concerns about third-party financing
 
 
 167. See supra Part II.A. 
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of private litigation.
168
 There is much to be said on both sides of that 
debate.
169
 
Finally, private settings that do not involve litigation or disputes might 
also present asymmetric information problems where our analysis is 
relevant. For example, companies often want to get information from 
outsiders about the performance of their employees or other non-human 
assets.
170
 Facebook, for example, offers a minimum $500 reward to users 
who report technical bugs in their program.
171
 Our model predicts that 
Facebook will get too many tips because they do not impose a cost on the 
tipsters. Some of Facebook’s comments regarding those tips suggest this is 
true. One tipster found a bug that allowed him to post on private timelines 
of people he is not connected to. His tip was ignored and Facebook noted 
that it could not respond to tips when its technicians cannot reproduce the 
bug. The tipster responded by posting his complaint on the private 
timeline of Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg. He did not receive the 
reward.
172
 
Facebook’s response appears to be of the same nature as the SEC’s 
response to tips about Bernie Madoff.
173
 In a world of too much 
information, the recipients are forced to adopt high (perhaps arbitrary) 
criteria for responding to tips. Our model suggests Facebook might be 
wise to adopt a system that imposes costs on the tipsters to screen the 
information.
174
  
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 
J.L. ECON. & POLICY 593 (2012); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party 
Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 574 (2010); Daniel C. Cox, Comment, 
Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 153, 154–
59 (1990). The issue has been discussed in popular press: Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money 
on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1; Lisa Rickard, Why Are Hedge Funds 
Allowed to Invest in Litigation?, THE ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/national/archive/2012/07/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-to-invest-in-litigation/259345/; Vanessa 
O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2011, at B1. 
 169. The financing of litigation also ties in with the role of lawyers on contingent fees. We 
acknowledge that contingency fees for lawyers can operate as a screening mechanism. In some sense, 
with contingency fees, the lawyer is “buying” a partial stake in a suit. They will only take on suits that 
have a high likelihood of winning. While the precise mechanism is different, the screening effect is 
similar to that of qui tam. For more on contingency fees, see Kritzer, supra note 129 and references 
within. 
 170. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 152; Strahilevitz & Abrams, supra note 152. 
 171. Bug Bounty Info, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/whitehat (last visited Feb. 11, 
2014) (login required). 
 172. Steven Musil, Researcher Posts Facebook Bug Report to Mark Zuckerberg’s Wall, CNET 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57599043-93/researcher-posts-
facebook-bug-report-to-mark-zuckerbergs-wall/. 
 173. See supra note 144. 
 174. They might also adopt a mechanism that commits them to a formula for determining the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1169 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Efficient detection of fraud is important. Detection by an ill-informed, 
resource-constrained regulator can be improved by tapping into private 
information held by individuals. By using this private information, the 
regulator can focus its resources on investigating those firms who are more 
likely to have committed fraud. In doing so, the regulator can deter fraud 
at lower cost. Whistleblowers, therefore, serve an important regulatory and 
social function. Providing financial rewards to whistleblowers who 
successfully uncover fraud encourages this outcome. Financial rewards 
alone, however, are not perfect. The increase in the quantity of information 
should not come at the expense of the quality of information. Diluting the 
quality of the information reduces the deterrent value and can defeat the 
ultimate purpose of the scheme.  
We suggest that the mechanism through which whistleblowers are 
channeled to seek reward affects the incentives of the whistleblower in 
dynamic ways. By making rewards to whistleblowers contingent upon 
success and making the losses suffered by whistleblowers contingent upon 
failure, the quality of the information will increase. The mechanism needs 
to balance both the rewards and the costs to maximize the likelihood of 
detecting fraud and generating optimal deterrence.  
The rewards under the DFA scheme are success-contingent, but the 
private costs that must be borne by whistleblowers are low and not loss-
contingent. This reduction in cost reduces the height of the screen and 
serves to encourage whistleblowers with low-quality information. Under 
the DFA scheme, we predict that the SEC will be inundated with, on 
average, lower quality tips. We further predict that this information 
overload will dilute the deterrence effect. 
It is too early to determine whether our predictions about the DFA’s 
whistle-blowing scheme are being borne out, although the SEC has 
already reported a large number of tips.
175
 Since the adoption of the new 
whistle-blowing scheme, the SEC has considered but rejected changing 
 
 
reward rather than the current scheme: “There is no maximum reward: each bug is awarded a bounty 
based on its severity and creativity.” Bug Bounty Info, supra note 171; see Ferziger & Currell, supra 
note 21 (noting the value of a nondiscretionary reward). 
 175. In the first seven weeks of the program in 2011 there were 334 tips. There were 3001 official 
tips in fiscal year 2012 and 3238 in fiscal year 2013. In 2013 the attorneys in the office returned 2018 
phone calls—all within 24 hours. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 49 at 8. Pre-DFA systems 
for collecting and reporting tips makes it difficult to make a direct comparison, and as we noted above, 
the problem has never appeared to one of quantity. See supra notes 118–19 & 144–45. 
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the mechanism to one that requires qui tam actions.
176
 The Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) decided against recommending qui tam on the 
grounds that such actions “could attract unscrupulous bounty hunters” and 
“may result in undesirable outcomes such as frivolous litigation.”177 Our 
model suggests the exact opposite. Unscrupulous whistle-blowing and 
frivolous lawsuits are more likely to be a concern under the current DFA 
scheme that has no imposed costs to screen them out. 
The qui tam mechanism works well in the FCA context precisely 
because a court-centric system disproportionately places the burden for 
losses on plaintiffs with poor information. Our model predicts that courts 
under the FCA are not likely inundated with poor tips and non-meritorious 
claims. This is precisely what the empirical literature bears out.
178
 
These screening benefits of qui tam under the FCA have been curiously 
overlooked in the literature. Prior work comparing the court-centric 
mechanism of the FCA to the regulator-centric mechanism of the DFA 
focuses on other aspects of the mechanism, such as agency capture. Of 
greater concern is the quality of information that can be generated using 
the court as a screen. Erecting this screen better achieves the primary 
purpose of the whistle-blowing regimes: deterring fraud.  
 
 
 176. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, EVALUATION 
OF THE SEC WHISTLEBLOWER’S PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 511 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2013/511.pdf. 
 177. Id. at 28. 
 178. See Kwok, supra note 10, Kwok, supra note 29, and Engstrom, supra note 19. 
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